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from other social institutions, but rather that the success of a formal
property rights regime is contingent upon the successful operation
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the process of transition from an informal to a formal property
rights regime and argues that the appropriate model for facilitating
that transition crucially depends on the reason for the perpetuation
of the informal regime.
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INTRODUCTION

The substantial body of economic development literature that
has accumulated over the past several decades has examined a
myriad of factors in seeking to provide both a descriptive account
of what causes growth as well as prescriptive policies for what
poor countries should do to catch up with richer states. Although
few would contend that any one policy can raise the standards of
living of those in the world’s poorest countries to levels
comparable to those in the world’s richest countries, it has become
conventional wisdom amongst most economists that, whatever else
the state does, it should provide effective institutions and processes
to protect private property rights and enforce contracts, which are
regarded as pre-requisites to efficient and dynamic market
economies. In the words of two prominent law and economics
scholars in a forthcoming book, Law and the Poverty of Nations,
“inadequate institutions to enforce property and contract law is the
most pervasive and fundamental defect in the legal framework of
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poor countries.”1 On this view, law plays a critical role in
promoting economic development and should be accorded the
highest developmental priority. One of the Authors has examined
the contract enforcement pillar of these claimed preconditions to
economic growth elsewhere.2 Here, the Authors address the
property rights protection pillar of this conventional wisdom.
The significance of property rights for economic growth has
been the subject of much writing by development theorists and
policy-makers alike. The so-called “Washington Consensus”
identified property rights reform as one of the major areas of
reform for the developing world.3 The World Bank has similarly
highlighted the importance of property rights, and has supported
and financed programs for the formalization of property rights and
the creation of titling systems to secure such rights.4 While some of
the research emanating from the World Bank in recent years has
advocated a more nuanced approach to its policies relating to
property rights and development,5 other documents have seemed
to follow its traditional attitude that the formalization of property
rights is virtually always desirable.6
1 ROBERT COOTER & HANS-BERND SCHAEFER, LAW AND THE POVERTY OF NATIONS
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 12); see also KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW—GROWTH
NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 91 (2006) (“Proponents of
the rule of law in the contest of economic development often express the core of
their position . . . by emphasizing the need to ‘enforce contracts and protect
property rights.’”).
2 See Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and
Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2006) (discussing
“whether the existence of a formal contract law and enforcement regime
significantly contributes to economic growth in developing countries”).
3 See John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN
AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 17 (John Williamson ed.,
1990) (noting property rights as an area of insecurity that needs to be corrected in
Latin America).
4 World Bank, World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for
Everyone, 2 (2004), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005
/Resources/complete_report.pdf; see also Ahmed Galal & Omar Razzaz, Reforming
Land and Real Estate Markets 20–21 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper
No.
2616,
1999),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636201 (assessing the World Bank’s experiences with
formalizing property rights in developing nations).
5 See KLAUS DEININGER, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION
5–6 (2003) (finding “a considerable evolution and increased sophistication” in the
recent recommendations for property reform).
6 See e.g., World Bank, supra note 4, at 80–84 (outlining measures to achieve
formalization of property rights).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/1

2008]

PROPERTY RIGHTS

401

Perhaps most reflective of the importance that property rights
have acquired in contemporary thinking on economic development
has been the success and influence of Hernando De Soto’s The
Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails
Everywhere Else, which argues that strong protection for private
property rights is the key factor that explains the developed
world’s economic success.7 Indeed, on De Soto’s account, the
potential benefits of formalization are significant. De Soto claims
that “the total value of the real estate held but not legally owned by
the poor of the Third World and former communist nations is at
least $9.3 trillion,” which he characterizes as “dead capital.”8
This broad assertion is unsatisfactory, however, as it leaves a
great deal of indeterminacy in terms of the actual policies implied
by the claim. The theoretical and empirical literature which has
emerged in support of this claim has been used by some to
advocate titling and registration programs as a general solution to
the problem of property rights insecurity. This Article will argue
that this blanket approach towards the establishment of stronger
property rights is unwarranted and counterproductive. Rather, the
Authors will argue that a more nuanced approach is required to
craft successful development policies regarding property rights.
To that end, this Article will present, and seek to provide answers
to, three questions that must be asked regarding the process of
strengthening property rights regimes.
First, do the benefits of formalizing property rights outweigh
the costs of doing so at all stages of development? While there are
compelling theoretical reasons—supported by numerous
econometric studies—to believe that a number of economic
benefits emerge from formal property regimes, there are also a
number of economic and social costs which arise in creating and
maintaining such regimes. The assumption that the benefits will
always outweigh the costs is unwarranted; it is thus important to
examine the conditions under which this assumption will hold.
The answer to the first question also necessarily involves an
examination of the form that a property rights regime might take,

HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 218 (2000); see also Madeleine Albright, It’s
Time For Empowerment, in THE WORLD IN 2007, at 65 (2006) (noting that property
right reform is essential to economic success for the third world).
8 DE SOTO, supra note 7, at 35.
7

THE
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as many of the costs and benefits depend on specific aspects of the
property regime in question.
Second, what social, economic, political, and legal
preconditions are necessary for a formal property rights regime to
function effectively? A formal property regime cannot exist in a
vacuum at the state level, but rather it requires the existence of a
number of complementary institutions, including an effective
police force, a strong judiciary, and other similar institutions. Yet it
is also important not to ignore the importance of informal norms
and codes of behavior. The existence of social norms, which are
not in serious conflict with the formal regime, may in fact be a
precondition for an effective formal property system. Thus, it is
important to understand the preconditions, both at the state and
societal level, which are necessary for a formal property regime to
operate as envisioned by policy-makers.
Third, how does the process of reforming property rights
regimes actually occur? The answer to this question depends on
the process by which property rights regimes change over time. If,
as some authors have argued, property rights regimes will evolve
naturally over time, then there may be a limited role for
intentionally designed reforms in shaping them. By contrast, if
various factors can shape this evolutionary process, then
intentionally designed reforms may have a more significant role to
play. Answering this question will therefore also involve an
analysis of the different impediments to this evolutionary process,
as well as an exploration of the differing responses that may be
required.
This Article will proceed by examining each of these questions
in turn, exploring both theoretical considerations as well as
empirical evidence.
2.

THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A FORMAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
REGIME

2.1. The Benefits of a Formal Property Rights Regime
2.1.1.

The Benefits of Secure Property Arrangements

Before moving to questions about the nature of an optimal
property rights regime, it is first important to highlight briefly
some of the reasons why property has occupied such a prominent
place in the development literature in recent years. While much of
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the literature has made sweeping claims about the benefits of
private property, the literature has also disaggregated the benefits
by analyzing the number of distinct economic benefits which
private property can bring.
Prior to outlining these separate benefits, it should be noted
that it is simplistic to speak of private property rights as a whole as
leading to economic growth. As many authors have pointed out,
one’s property over an object can typically be disaggregated into a
number of rights, none of which need necessarily go together. In
examining issues related to property rights and development,
however, it is sufficient to use Eggertsson’s aggregation of these
rights into three broad categories: the exclusive right to use an
asset, the right to appropriate its economic value, and the right to
sell or otherwise alienate that asset.9 Indeed, most of the issues
discussed below can be linked to one of these three rights.
It is also important to note that these rights are not
dichotomous, but rather can exist in property to varying degrees of
security. This is especially the case with the first two rights, which
can be grouped together for practical purposes in the concept of
tenure security. In this formulation, the stronger one’s exclusive
right to use and appropriate the economic value of the land, the
more secure one’s tenure is. Indeed, security of tenure will be used
frequently below to refer to strong protection of one’s exclusive
rights to use and benefit from the asset in question. By contrast,
tenure insecurity refers to a situation where one’s claims to
property are likely not to be respected. This insecurity can arise
from either a) other individuals not respecting an individual’s
claim to his property and claiming that property as their own or
otherwise encroaching on it, or b) the state not respecting an
individual’s claim to that land and expropriating that land.10
Having clarified some of these distinctions, some of the often-cited
benefits of secure property rights will be highlighted.

THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 34–35 (1990).
See THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, IMPERFECT INSTITUTIONS: POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS
OF REFORM 182 (2005) (noting that property insecurity arises when states do not
enforce a person’s rights against an encroacher or from the state taking the land
without compensation).
9

10
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2.1.1.1. Exclusive Use Leads to the Resources Being Used
Efficiently
There are two mechanisms through which various bundles of
private property rights lead to resources being used in the most
efficient way possible. The first claim is that because private
property leads individuals to fully internalize the costs and
benefits of their use of an asset, the existence of private property
will lead people to use resources in the most socially efficient
way.11 When the protection of property rights over a given
resource is weak, significant inefficiencies in the use and
exploitation of that resource can arise. First, where numerous
individuals are using the same resource, that resource may be
overexploited, as individuals will not consider the detrimental
effects on others from their own decisions related to resource use.12
Second, where no property rights are assigned to a resource,
individuals may have an incentive to appropriate that resource as
quickly as possible lest others appropriate it first; this can lead to
inefficient and wasteful resource mining.13 Third, a lack of secure
11 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347, 348–49 (1967) (discussing how private property rights force the owner of
these rights to internalize the costs of their actions); see also Armen A. Alchian &
Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16, 24 (1973)
(“[P]rivate rights can be socially useful precisely because they encourage persons
to take account of social costs.”) (emphasis omitted); R. H. Coase, The Federal
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 27–35 (1959) (arguing that the use of
a pricing system for the assignment of broadcast frequencies would lead to a more
efficient allocation than government regulated assignments); Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245 (1968) (discussing how communal
property allows people to push social costs such as pollution onto society as a
whole). Proponents of new institutional economics have also examined this claim.
One proponent, Douglass North, argues that private property rights raise the
private rate of return of an activity closer to the social rate of return, thereby
spurring economic growth. DOUGLASS NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN
ECONOMIC HISTORY 6 (1981) (“The existence of a positive return to savings is also
dependent on the structure of property rights.”).
12 See ERIK FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY:
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 111–16 (2d ed. 2005)
(summarizing the problems that arise under common ownership of resources).
13 See Thráinn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common Property, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 73, 77 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S.
McChesney eds., 2003) (“In effect, the now-or-never motive drives actors to
deplete nonrenewable resources without due attention to optimal time
preferences and patterns of demand.”). For a formal demonstration of this point,
see Louis Hotte, Conflicts Over Property Rights and Natural-Resource Exploitation at
the Frontier, 66 J. DEV. ECON. 1 (2001), who models resource use in the case of
insecure ownership and shows that where landowners believe that they may lose

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/1

2008]

PROPERTY RIGHTS

405

property rights over a certain type of asset may lead parties to
make socially suboptimal asset allocations, as they might invest in
assets which have lower returns but which are easier to protect.14
Thus, these claims suggest that the stronger private property is, in
the sense of private ownership and allowing individuals to capture
the returns from their efforts, the greater the efficiency in the
exploitation and use of a resource will be.
It is important to note, however, that under certain economic
conditions, both open-access systems, where no one is excluded,
and communal property arrangements, where non-members are
excluded, can be economically efficient arrangements.15 For
example, a system of open access to land could be a rational
response to economic forces if land were not a scarce good, as in
such circumstances, there is no benefit to creating formal
individual property rights, while there would be a cost.16
Similarly, if land is only somewhat scarce and a community is
relatively small, communal property arrangements may combine
the benefits of socially efficient alternatives through collective

their access to a resource in the near future, they may exploit the resource in a
socially wasteful manner.
On a related point, where individuals face tenure insecurity, they may not
make socially-optimal investments for the long-term protection or sustainability
of a particular resource or the environment generally because they are uncertain
ex ante about their likelihood of appropriating the benefits of such investments.
For example, Gebremedhin and Swinton show that the probability of farmers
making long-term investments in soil conservation measures in Ethiopia was
related to their perceived degree of tenure security in their land. Berhanu
Gebremedhin & Scott M. Swinton, Investment in Soil Conservation in Northern
Ethiopia: the Role of Land Tenure Security and Public Programs, 29 AGRIC. ECON. 69
(2003).
14 See Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, Financial Development, Property Rights, and
Growth 58 J. FIN. 2401, 2402 (2003) (“[O]ur idea of property rights is the degree of
protection of the return on assets against powerful competitors.”).
15 See DAM, supra note 1, at 151 (“It would be a mistake, however, to conclude
that all communal ownership is so inefficient that it is an obstacle to economic
development.”); see also Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1332
(1993) (noting the advantages of communal ownership); see generally DEININGER,
supra note 5, at 29 (discussing generally some of the factors which can lead group
rights to be more efficient than individual rights).
16 See Omotunde E.G. Johnson, Economic Analysis, the Legal Framework and
Land Tenure Systems, 15 J.L. & ECON. 259, 271 (1972) (arguing that in certain
circumstances communal property systems allow for more cost savings than
personal property).
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action with lower enforcement and transaction costs than
individual property rights.17
The second mechanism through which strong property rights
promote efficiency is that when the land over which one has strong
private property rights is also alienable, the land can be transferred
from less efficient users to individuals who will put it to more
efficient uses.18 Because the land is more economically valuable to
the more efficient user, mutually beneficial trades should be
possible wherein land is transferred from less efficient users to
more efficient users.
2.1.1.2. Security of Tenure and Easy Transferability of Property
Increase Access to Credit
The linkage between property and access to credit is another
economic aspect of property that has been extensively explored.
Indeed, one of De Soto’s main arguments in The Mystery of Capital
is that secure property rights allow individuals to use their
possessions as sources of capital.19 As Feder and Onchan note,
creditors will be much more likely to provide credit where that
credit can be secured with collateral. Property, however, whether
real or personal, can only be effective collateral if creditors believe
that they will be able to gain possession of this collateral in the
event of the debtor’s default.20 Thus, the debtor must have secure
ownership of the property and have the ability to easily transfer it
to the creditor.
A lack of access to credit can significantly impair economic
development. Without access to credit, the requisite capital may
17 See Gershon Feder & David Feeny, Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory
and Implications for Development Policy, 5 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 135, 143 (1991)
(discussing how voluntary collective action in a communal property arrangement
enabled an efficient solution to a problem).
18 See Klaus Deininger & Gershon Feder, Land Institutions and Land Markets 7
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2014, 1999) (“[T]here is some
evidence that a higher degree of transfer rights provides additional incentives for
investments and for more efficient use . . . .”).
19 DE SOTO, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that property rights allow Western
nations to “inject[] life into assets and make[] them generate capital”).
20 Gershon Feder & Tongroj Onchan, Land Ownership Security and Farm
Investment in Thailand, 69 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 311, 311 (1987); see also Heywood
Fleisig, Secured Transactions: The Power of Collateral, 33 FIN. & DEV. 44, 45 (1996)
(discussing how enhanced land ownership security makes lenders more likely to
extend credit).
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not be available to finance individuals’ investments, thereby
preventing individuals from making profitable investments.
According to De Soto, in the United States, “up to 70 percent of the
credit new businesses receive comes from using formal titles as
collateral for mortgages.”21 Even where creditors do not require
property as collateral, the interest rate on that credit may be higher,
reflecting the higher risk which creditors face when making
unsecured loans. Projects which would have been financed at the
lower interest rate available for secured loans may become
unprofitable or may be deemed too risky at the higher rate for
unsecured credit.
It should be noted, however, that while formal title can increase
the supply of credit, it may not immediately lead to greater
borrowing if demand for credit is limited. Even complete security
and alienability of land may not improve access to credit if
landholders are risk-averse and perceive a risk of losing their land
if it is mortgaged.22 This problem is especially acute when
landowners have no access to insurance or alternative sources of
wealth.23
2.1.1.3.

Security of Tenure Increases Incentives for Investment

The increase in investment is perhaps the most discussed of the
beneficial effects of strong property rights.24 There are three
distinct ways in which stronger property rights can increase
DE SOTO, supra note 7, at 84.
Jean-Philippe Platteau, Does Africa Need Land Reform?, in EVOLVING LAND
RIGHTS, POLICY AND TENURE IN AFRICA 51, 59 (Camilla Toulmin & Julian Quan eds.,
2000). The ability to use land as collateral may actually be detrimental to smaller
farmers. Eric Van Tassel’s model shows that where farmers have limited income,
they may not be willing to risk losing their land in order to acquire loans.
Creditors, however, may be unwilling to provide unsecured loans to such
farmers, as they may perceive the farmer’s preference for an unsecured loan over
a secured loan as indicating that the farmer poses a high risk of default. Eric Van
Tassel, Credit Access and Transferable Land Rights, 56 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 151,
151–53 (2004).
23 See Stephen R. Boucher et al., The Impact of “Market-Friendly” Reforms on
Credit and Land Markets in Honduras and Nicaragua, 33 WORLD DEV. 107, 111 (2004)
(indicating that “land-poor households” may be unwilling to take out loans
without insurance because of the risk of collateral loss).
24 One of the most often cited papers in the contemporary literature on the
theoretical and formal underpinnings of this effect is Besley’s work, in which he
formally models the relationship between security of tenure and investment.
Timothy Besley, Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from
Ghana, 103 J. POL. ECON. 903 (1995).
21
22
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investment. First, where tenure is more secure, individuals will be
more likely to invest significant resources to improve their
property and make it more productive. Second, where property is
alienable, individuals have greater incentives to improve property
because they will be able to realize a gain from that improvement
upon selling it. Finally, where property is secure and alienable, the
supply of credit is increased, thereby giving individuals access to
the capital necessary to improve their land.25
2.1.1.4. Security of Tenure Decreases Inefficient Competition for
Resources
Where property is relatively secure, two types of socially
wasteful activities can be eliminated. First, where property rights
are insecure, individuals may attempt to invade others’ land or
steal their assets for themselves. Second, and in response to this
threat, individuals will have to expend resources to protect their
own property from such depredations; perhaps the most
destructive version of this type of private protection is the property
protection provided by organized crime.26 Even where outright
conflict does not occur, insecurity may induce individuals to
expend resources on legal action trying to assert ownership claims
to contested property.27 This reasoning implies that more secure
and well-defined property may lead individuals to substitute away
from unproductive conflict over property towards productive
activities.28

Platteau, supra note 22.
See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 43
(2000) (“Organized crime . . . is the dark side of private ordering—an
entrepreneurial response to the inefficiencies in the property rights and
enforcement framework supplied by the state.”).
27 See Tim Hanstad, Designing Land Registration Systems for Developing
Countries, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 647, 654–55 (1998) (suggesting that uncertainty
over land interests, like ill-defined boundaries, often leads to litigation, especially
in the absence of effective land registration systems).
28 See Erica Field, Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in
Peru, 122 Q. J. ECON. 1561 (2007) (suggesting that formal property rights will
increase household labor supply since individuals will have to spend less time
informally enforcing their property claims); see also DE SOTO, supra note 7, 171–74
(arguing that formal property rights allow individuals to focus on “their assets’
economic potential”); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE
REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 160 (June Abbott trans., 1989).
25
26
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The Necessity of a Formal Property Rights Regime

Many development scholars and policymakers contend that the
benefits of private property described above are best achieved by a
formal state-run property system. Indeed, the intellectual tradition
of viewing the state as being necessary for the enforcement of
claims to private property has a long genesis.29 Hobbes viewed the
existence of a powerful state as necessary to overcome the anarchy
that would prevail in a state of nature.30 Locke similarly viewed
the primary purpose of the state as being one of protecting
individuals’ property, i.e. their life, liberty, and estate.31 In The
Wealth of Nations, Smith viewed administering justice as an
important role for government, which in part, for Smith, meant the
protection of private property rights.32 Although Hume viewed
property rights as conventions that all would respect for the benefit
of society as a whole, he also recognized that individuals’ shortsightedness might inhibit their ability to respect such conventions.
He thus argued that the principal purpose of government was to
overcome this short-sightedness by enforcing conventions such as
property and contract.33
A number of modern law and economics scholars have also
emphasized the importance of strong property rights in economic
development. Posner emphasizes the importance of developing
strong property rights regimes for fostering economic growth,34
and North suggests that strong property rights are one of the most

29 For a brief intellectual history of property rights and economics, see Edwin
G. West, Property Rights in the History of Economic Thought: From Locke to J.S. Mill, in
PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 13, at 20.
30 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189–91 (Richard Tuck ed., Penguin Books
1985) (1651) (describing a system of laws necessary to bring man out of a state of
nature).
31 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 86–88 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690) (stating the necessity of the state for
protecting private property).
32 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 901–02 (Edwin Cannan ed.,
Bantam Dell 2003) (1776) (describing the importance of such government
functions as taxing private property).
33 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, in HUME’S MORAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 69-80, 97-101 (Henry D. Aiken ed., 1962).
34 See Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development,
13 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 1 (2003) (“A modernizing nation’s economic
prosperity requires at least a modest legal infrastructure centered on the
protection of property and contract rights.”).
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important institutions for growth.35 Similarly, Knack and Keefer
claim that “[f]ew would dispute that the security of property and
contractual rights and the efficiency with which governments
manage the provision of public goods and the creation of
government policies are significant determinants of the speed with
which countries grow.”36 McCloskey in discussing England’s
economic development states, “[i]f the word ‘precondition’ as it is
used in the literature of economic growth includes anything it
must include the formation of the legal institutions of private
property . . . .”37
Perhaps the best-known contemporary advocate of strong
formal property rights in spurring development has been De
Soto.38 Speaking of titling, he says that “[i]t is the unavailability of
these essential representations that explains why people who have
adapted every other Western invention, from the paper clip to the
nuclear reactor, have not been able to produce sufficient capital to
make their domestic capitalism work.”39 Similarly, he writes that
“[t]he formal property system is capital’s hydroelectric plant.”40
Although these views reflect the prevalence of the belief that
formal property rights are necessary for economic development, it
is important to specify why formal property rights, rather than
more informal property arrangements, as discussed below, are
viewed as a sine qua non of development. Formal property regimes
are considered by these authors to be essential to economic growth
because, when fully functional and accessible, they provide clearer
and more secure allocations of property rights than could any
informal measures to protect private property.41 Where there is a
credible third-party enforcer of property rights—in particular, the
state—”uncertainty is reduced or completely eliminated.”42
35 NORTH, supra note 11, at 6 (“The security of property rights has been a
critical determination of the rate of saving and capital formation.”).
36 Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: CrossCountry Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207, 207
(1995).
37 Donald McCloskey, The Enclosure of Open Fields: Preface to a Study of Its
Impact on the Efficiency of English Agriculture in the Eighteenth Century, 32 J. ECON.
HIST. 15, 16 (1972).
38 See generally DE SOTO, supra note 7.
39 Id. at 7.
40 Id. at 47.
41 See generally Johnson, supra note 16; Dam, supra note 1.
42 NORTH, supra note 11, at 36.
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Indeed, it seems intuitive that a state-backed title registry would
have the capacity to provide the most secure property rights, given
the extensive adjudicative and coercive capacities that one
associates with a fully-functioning state. Moreover, a formal
property system can also reduce transaction costs in market
interactions by providing increased information to third parties
about the rights that an individual has over land. Thus, many
contend that a formal property regime is necessary to provide the
benefits of private property.
2.1.3.

Informal Mechanisms for Securing the Benefits of Private
Property

A formal property rights regime may not be the only method of
securing the benefits discussed above.
Indeed, informal
mechanisms may provide many of the same benefits as a private
property rights regime. Within the literature examining informal
mechanisms as a substitute for formal mechanisms, there are two
strands of literature that explore how this can occur. Although
they are in many ways linked, they differ in some respects.43 First,
the game theoretic literature explores how cooperation can emerge
as a result of repeated interactions among individuals. Second, the
law and social norms literature examines the development of
informal norms as a mechanism of social order and control. Both
of these sets of literature have strong implications for the
possibility of efficient, informal property regimes, as they suggest
that either spontaneous cooperation or informal norms can
substitute for a formal property regime maintained by the state.

43 One important difference between the game theoretic analysis of
cooperation and the law and social norms literature is that while the former
supposes no order and shows how people might rationally cooperate, the law and
social norms literature examines some of the negative (e.g., gossip, violence) and
positive (e.g., rewards) sanctions that groups may use to enforce compliance with
a norm or convention. For a survey of this point as well as a substantial list of
articles which examine a variety of negative sanctions, see Richard H. McAdams
& Eric B. Rasmusen, Norms in Law and Economics (July 7, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=580843 (last visited Nov. 21, 2008). Thus, while the game theoretic literature
examines how rational cooperation can emerge because of repeated interactions,
the law and social norms literature highlights some of the other sanctions (other
than simply choosing not to cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma) that can be used
to maintain order, showing how incentive structures can be changed through
decentralized mechanisms.
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Game Theory Analysis

One theoretical perspective examining the conditions under
which cooperation will occur is the game theoretic perspective.
The prisoner’s dilemma is a quintessential model of a situation in
which parties must choose whether to cooperate or not cooperate
with each other. While standard game theoretic models suggest
that cooperative outcomes will not be achieved in a one-off
prisoner’s dilemma, Axelrod shows that mutually beneficial
cooperative outcomes can arise in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma.44
The general requirement for cooperation is that such games
continue infinitely; however, Kreps et al. show how informational
asymmetries (e.g., believing for some reason that the other players
have a particularly cooperative disposition) can also generate
cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma.45 Moreover,
while the models above have assumed repeated interactions
between the same players, Ellison shows how even this
assumption can be relaxed, as cooperation can also emerge among
a small group whose members are anonymously matched in each
round of the game.46 Thus, various conditions under which
cooperation have emerged are in many ways relatively robust.
Experimental evidence has confirmed many of these results,
showing, for example, that cooperation can occur even in a finitely
repeated prisoner’s dilemma as individuals try to build a
reputation for themselves.47

44 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) [hereinafter
AXELROD, EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION]; see also Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of
Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 306, 307 (1981) [hereinafter
Axelrod, Cooperation Among Egoists] (showing that “[w]ith an indefinite number of
interactions, cooperation can emerge”).
45 David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’
Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982). While the repeated prisoner’s dilemma
has largely been viewed as involving a number (potentially infinite) of discrete
stages, some modeling has shown cooperative results to be even more robust
when the model is made continuous—something which is much closer to the
reality of tenure questions addressed below. See also David M. Kreps & Robert
Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253, 275 (1982)
(arguing that uncertainty about the motivations of one or more of the players in a
finitely repeated game can affect cooperation).
46 Glenn Ellison, Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma with Anonymous Random
Matching, 61 REV. ECON. STUD. 567 (1994).
47 James Andreoni & John H. Miller, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence, 103 ECON. J. 570, 571 (1993).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/1

2008]

PROPERTY RIGHTS

413

These principles are easily applicable to a regime of respect for
property. The issue of respecting land tenure can be thought of as
a prisoner’s dilemma: all parties gain when tenure is respected
(because of the lower costs associated with defending one’s land,
etc.), but each party has an incentive not to respect other parties’
tenure. The exploitation of communal resources has also been
viewed in this way.48 While the pessimistic predictions of the
prisoner’s dilemma have been used in the past to argue for a strong
state to enforce order (dating back to Hobbes’ Leviathan), if
cooperation can emerge as discussed above, this problem can be
overcome without the state’s intervention.49 Rational self-interest
rather than the coercive power of the state may lead parties to
respect socially efficient property arrangements.
The evolutionary game theory approach also has implications
for property rights considerations. Axelrod uses this approach and
shows that a strategy of “tit-for-tat” (cooperation in the first round
followed by playing whatever strategy the other player played in
the previous round) is a collectively stable strategy.50 Axelrod also
shows how a relatively small cluster of individuals playing “tit-fortat” can invade a population that is primarily comprised of
defectors. In the context of property rights, this suggests a
plausible mechanism for how cooperation and mutual respect can
emerge and how it might be collectively stable. Cooperative play
(i.e., respect for land tenure) might emerge, since even small
groups which decide to respect land tenure might be more
successful than those groups which do not respect tenure, and
thereby come to dominate larger populations.
2.1.3.2.

The Law and Social Norms Literature

In addition to the game-theoretic framework discussed above,
the law and social norms literature provides an alternative
explanation of how efficient property arrangements could emerge
outside of a formal, legal framework. An important perspective in
this line of literature is Ellickson’s examination of how various
informal rules can emerge which in certain circumstances make the
Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1388–91; Hardin, supra note 11, at 1245.
See Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1366 (providing a narrative of how this type
of cooperation might emerge).
50 For a discussion of evolutionary stability in the biological context, see J.
Maynard Smith, The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts, 47 J.
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 209 (1974).
48
49
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formal legal system irrelevant.51 Ellickson predicts that when
social relations are close-knit, informal norms will encourage
people in non-zero-sum situations to make choices that will conjoin
to produce the maximum aggregate objective payoff to the group
by minimizing deadweight losses and transaction costs.52 This has
led Ellickson to suggest that lawmakers should defer to these
informal norms, as the norms are more likely to be welfare
maximizing than centrally crafted rules.53 Epstein reaches a similar
conclusion, noting that “custom should be followed in those cases
in which there are repeat and reciprocal interactions between the
same parties, for then their incentives to reach the correct rule are
exceedingly powerful.”54 These arguments imply that customary
arrangements can be sufficient to generate order between parties.
Although Ellickson’s theory rather optimistically predicts that
such norms will emerge, it does not provide a strong explanation
of the processes that determine when and why these norms emerge
and why individuals adhere to them. McAdams suggests an
esteem-based theory of norms, whereby a norm arises if “(1) there
is a consensus about the positive or negative esteem worthiness of
engaging in [an action], (2) there is some risk that others will detect
whether one engages in [that action] . . . and (3) the existence of this
consensus and risk of detection is well-known within the
population.”55 These conditions change the costs and benefits of
engaging in or not engaging in an activity, and a norm will arise if
the esteem benefit (cost) is greater than the benefit (cost) of (not)
engaging in the activity. Eric Posner presents an alternative
signaling-based model of norms, whereby social norms arise from
the actions of individuals who are trying to signal to others that
they are a cooperative type in order to gain benefits from

51 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991) [hereinafter ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW].
52 Id. at ch.10. See also Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing
Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 84 (1989)
(arguing that “when people are situated in a close-knit group, they will tend to
develop for the ordinary run of problems norms that are wealth maximizing”).
53 ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 51, at ch. 10.
54 Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and
Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 126 (1992).
55 Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 358 (1997).
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interactions with those individuals.56 Although the two theories
have differences, they both highlight that a cooperative and
welfare-enhancing norm can arise through the rational actions of a
large number of individuals. Moreover, over time these norms
may become internalized such that individuals might adhere to a
norm even in situations where doing so might not be strictly
rational.57
In the context of property, this would suggest that cooperation
might be possible which would lead to the emergence of norms
that yield many of the benefits that are claimed to flow from formal
property rights. With respect to security of tenure, for example,
this reasoning suggests that tenure security might arise among a
close-knit group if this were a welfare-maximizing rule. This type
of reasoning is consistent with the literature that stresses that
tenure security can increase in response to increasing relative
scarcity of land, since the welfare gains from secure tenure increase
as the scarcity of land increases.58 Similarly, Sjaastad and Bromley
have noted the presence in many African societies of a norm that
dictates that when an individual loses ownership of a piece of land,
the individual taking ownership must compensate the individual
losing ownership for the value of improvements made to the
land.59 This norm may provide the necessary incentives to make
improvements to land without some of the costs associated with
greater tenure security.
It is important to note that all of the informalist theories
presented above relate to property relations among individuals;
none of them relate specifically with tenure security in the sense of
freedom from a reasonable apprehension of expropriation of land
by the state. In terms of this aspect of property ownership, it seems
unlikely that an informalist would contest the fact that tenure
security vis-à-vis the state is important, but the perception of
56 Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-27 (2000)
[hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS].
57 POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 56, at 43–44.
58 Gershon Feder & Raymond Noronha, Land Rights Systems and Agricultural
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 143, 143–44 (1987)
(arguing that scarcity of land encourages the development of mechanisms to
secure such land); see also Demsetz, supra note 11.
59 Espen Sjaastad & Daniel W. Bromley, Indigenous Land Rights in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Appropriation, Security and Investment Demand, 25 WORLD DEV. 549, 553
(1997).
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tenure security against the state might be accomplished in a variety
of ways. All that is required for this type of tenure security is that
the individual not fear expropriation without compensation. To
this end, predictability may be more important than formal rights.
2.1.4.

Assessing the Empirical Evidence

Having examined the theoretical perspectives of formalists and
informalists, it is important to examine the empirical evidence
underlying each of these positions. A number of studies have been
conducted which have broadly linked strong property rights and
economic development without always specifying the causal
mechanism or the particular property rights in question. While
such studies are of less value in assessing or designing particular
property rights regimes than are empirical studies that examine
particular rights and particular benefits, they are still worth noting,
if only because of their prominence in the economic development
literature.
In his important paper on the determinants of economic
growth, Barro asserts that strong property rights are associated
with higher growth rates, although rather than using any direct
measure of property rights, he uses measures of political instability
and asserts a direct linkage of such indicators to property rights.60
Knack and Keefer note the problem in the Barro paper and other
earlier papers of using poor proxies for property rights, and using
an aggregate of a number of indicators of institutional and income
quality, they find a linkage between property rights and income.61
Rodrik et al. find a link between strong property rights and
growth, although they explicitly acknowledge that their results do
not allow any conclusion to be drawn about the precise form of
property rights that promote development.62 Similarly, Acemoglu
and Johnson, using panel data from a number of countries,
conclude that countries with stronger property rights—as
measured by greater constraints on politicians and more protection
against expropriation—have higher incomes per capita, greater
investment rates, stronger credit markets, and more developed
60 Robert J. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries, 106 Q. J.
ECON. 407, 431–32 (1991).
61 Knack & Keefer, supra note 36.
62 Dani Rodrik et al., Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over
Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 131, 157–58
(2004).
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stock markets.63 They also find that property rights are much more
important than strong contractual rights.64 Finally, a number of
authors have highlighted the importance of property rights to the
rapid economic growth of the Western world.65
While these papers provide some empirical support for a
linkage between strong property rights and economic growth, the
ultimate implications of these results are relatively limited. These
papers all support the relatively uncontroversial claim that there is
a linkage between effective institutions and economic growth.
However, since the authors generally use broad measures of
institutional quality in their estimates rather than the degree of
formalization of property rights, none of them demonstrate that
legally enforceable private property rights themselves are related
to economic growth, nor do they suggest anything about the
precise nature of effective property rights regimes.
2.1.4.1.

The Empirics of Property Rights and Efficient Use

Much more relevant for this Article than the preceding
literature are those papers which attempt to link empirically formal
property regimes to the specific benefits of private property
discussed above. The evidence appears mixed in respect to the
linkage between formal property rights and efficient use of
resources. In one of the earlier studies of this type conducted in the

63 Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL.
ECON. 949, 953 (2005) (discussing positive impact of property rights institutions on
“current economic outcomes”).
64 Id. at 987 (finding that problems that arise due to contractual relationships
“are largely unrelated to political relationships and to property rights
institutions”).
65 De Long and Shleifer link pre-18th century European economic
development with security of property rights. See J. Bradford De Long & Andrei
Shleifer, Princes and Merchants: European City Growth Before the Industrial
Revolution, 36 J.L. & ECON. 671, 679 (1993) (discussing comparatively rapid growth
of cities with non-absolutist governments and, by implication, relatively strong
property rights regimes). Similarly, in a less rigorous and more narrative
approach to analyzing economic development, North and Thomas suggest that
sustained economic growth in the West was a result of the development of private
property rights. Douglass C. North & Robert Paul Thomas, An Economic Theory of
the Growth of the Western World, 23 ECON. HIST. REV. 1, 16 (1970) (arguing that
development of property rights increased productivity, ultimately leading to the
Industrial Revolution in Western Europe); see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT
PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 157
(1973) (hypothesizing that efficient economic organization, including property
rights, was key to the growth of the Western world from 900–1700).
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developing world, Bottomley argues that the inability to capture
the full returns from investment on communal land leads Libyan
tribesmen to use land for animal-grazing instead of more
productive and profitable almond-tree growing.66 In a classic
example from Western economic history, McCloskey estimates that
there were substantial efficiency gains from the enclosure
movement,67 although some have disputed the magnitude of these
gains.68 These issues continue to have relevance within developed
countries; for example, Flanagan and Alcantara argue that weak
and highly politicized property rights regimes on Canadian
aboriginal reserves are a significant impediment to efficient
resource use and economic growth.69
There is also some empirical evidence indicating that insecure
property rights can have a detrimental impact on businesses’
investment decisions. Claessens and Laeven show that firms
operating in areas of weak property rights protection will tend to
have fewer intangible assets relative to tangible assets, as the latter
are easier to protect from appropriation by other firms.70
Moreover, they find that this asset choice has resulted in significant
inefficiencies, with stronger growth, especially among new
businesses, being realized in firms located in countries with
stronger property protections and relatively higher stocks of
intangibles.71
In other situations, however, informal norms can result in
efficient resource allocation and exploitation. In their examination
of Mexico, McCarthy et al. find that the degree to which common
66 Anthony Bottomley, The Effect of the Common Ownership of Land Upon
Resource Allocation in Tripolitania, 39 LAND ECON. 91 (1963).
67 McCloskey, supra note 37, at 35 (noting that enclosure produced high
returns for land owners).
68 See, e.g., Gregory Clark, Commons Sense: Common Property Rights, Efficiency,
and Institutional Change, 58 J. ECON. HIST. 73, 73 (1998) (arguing that “gains from
enclosure existed only in the imaginations of wild-eyed eighteenth century
agrarian reformers” and that, in reality, the gains from enclosure were merely
modest).
69 Tom Flanagan & Christopher Alcantara, Individual Property Rights on
Canadian Indian Reserves, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 489, 530 (2004) (suggesting that
increasing tracts of aboriginal land “will never yield their maximum benefit . . . as
long as they are held as collective property subject to political management”).
70 Claessens & Laeven, supra note 14, at 2402 (explaining preference for
tangible assets in areas where property rights are weak).
71 Id. at 2423–31. Their results are particularly striking, as they appear to be
robust to a number of alternative model specifications. Id.
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access land is subject to overgrazing by cattle is inversely related to
the degree of cooperation between farmers,72 thereby indicating
that cooperation can lead to efficient outcomes. Similarly, Katz
compares two regions of Guatemala, one with a long-standing
population existing with informal social norms and another that is
quite new and thus lacking those social norms. These regions
show that even in the absence of formal property rights, resources
can be managed sustainably where there are unwritten social
norms guiding their use.73 Ostrom provides a number of examples
of relatively informal mechanisms for governing communal
resources, thus indicating that local solutions and decision-making
can result in efficient land use.74 For example, in Törbel,
Switzerland, a village of only 600 people, communal space for
cattle grazing is regulated by an Alp association which is governed
by the villagers themselves.75 Migot-Adholla et al. similarly argue
that the inefficiencies in communal land tenure in parts of Africa
may be very minor.76 These examples indicate that the absence of a
formal private property regime does not necessarily lead to
inefficient resource use; moreover, the examples generally accord
with the theoretical position of the informalists, such as Ellickson,
who believe that efficient social norms are more likely to emerge
where groups are relatively tight-knit and stable.
With respect to the alienability of land, it is by no means clear
that a formal property regime is necessary for the development of
an active land market. Some authors have argued that market-type
72 Nancy McCarthy et al., Land Allocation Under Dual Individual–Collective Use
in Mexico, 56 J. DEV. ECON. 239, 262–63 (1998).
73 Elizabeth G. Katz, Social Capital and Natural Capital: A Comparative Analysis
of Land Tenure and Natural Resource Management in Guatemala, 76 LAND ECON. 114,
129 (2000) (concluding that effective informal mechanisms for combating
externalities and managing natural capital can evolve where more formal
property rights regimes do not exist).
74 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 58–102 (1990) (offering specific case studies which support
her thesis that informal property rights managed by locals are often just as
effective in regulating common-pool resources as formal regulations imposed by
the outside).
75 Id. at 61–65. Ostrom also provides a number of examples of Japanese
villages that created village assemblies and utilized informal sanctions to govern
common lands. Id. at 65–69.
76 Shem Migot-Adholla et al., Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan
Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?, 5 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 155, 172 (1991)
(concluding that indigenous land rights systems are not a constraint on
productivity).
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mechanisms have developed in customary law, especially where
the efficiency gains from those mechanisms are highest, i.e., where
land is relatively scarce.77 Indeed, extreme scarcity may result in
the development of informal land markets even where market
transactions are illegal, such as in Rwanda.78 If active land markets
develop endogenously in response to economic incentives, this
implies that a formal property rights regime is not necessarily a
precondition to the development of an efficient land market.
While some authors have contended that market transfers will
be inhibited without the certainty made available by formal title, in
some circumstances customs have emerged which can, at least
partially, substitute for formal title in creating that certainty.
Jacoby and Minten, in their analysis of land in Madagascar, discuss
how most land sales in rural areas were accompanied by a sales
receipt which was signed by the village head, often with other
witnesses present.79 This was meant to provide the buyer with
certainty that the land had not already been sold to someone else
and that, in the eyes of the community, the land belonged to the
buyer. Informal mechanisms for land transfers have also been
documented in urban housing markets. Similarly, in her study of
Ho Chi Minh City, Kim finds a booming housing market, despite
relatively weak formal property rights protection for most
properties. She finds that neighborhood block committees and
ward officials play a major role in settling disputes and providing
the requisite certainty for a land market to develop.80 Interestingly,

77 For a discussion of this phenomenon in Kenya, see Richard Barrows &
Michael Roth, Land Tenure and Investment in African Agriculture: Theory and
Evidence, 28 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 265, 269–70 (1990). Where this is the case, it may
be more efficient to recognize local mechanisms of land transfer rather than try to
graft Western ones onto what may be functional customary institutions. See
Admos Chimhowu & Phil Woodhouse, Customary vs Private Property Rights?
Dynamics and Trajectories of Vernacular Land Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, 6 J.
AGRARIAN CHANGE 346, 348 (2006) (arguing that effective land policies require
recognition of local traditional systems of property rights).
78 Catherine André & Jean-Philippe Platteau, Land Relations Under Unbearable
Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap, 34 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 42 (1998)
(noting that population growth resulted in the development of informal property
ownership systems).
79 Hanan G. Jacoby & Bart Minten, Is Land Titling in Sub-Saharan Africa CostEffective? Evidence from Madagascar, 21 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 461, 467–68 (2007)
(noting that the approval by the village head serves as proof of ownership).
80 Annette M. Kim, A Market Without the ‘Right’ Property Rights: Ho Chi Minh
City, Vietnam’s Newly-Emerged Private Real Estate Market, 12 ECON. TRANSITION 275,
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using a hedonic price model, she also finds that while the added
certainty of formal legal title does increase property values, this
increase is relatively small: formal title increases the value of a
house by 11 percent, making formal property rights more valuable
than having a telephone connection but less valuable than having a
toilet.81
2.1.4.2.

The Empirics of Property Rights and Access to Credit

There have also been several studies which have examined the
linkage between the formalization of property rights and the
availability of credit. In this respect, the evidence is somewhat
mixed, although there is evidence of a linkage. It is important to
note the interplay between these studies and those noted above.
While title may increase the supply of credit, it may also increase
the demand for credit, as landowners will desire to improve their
property.
On the formalist side, Feder and Onchan show that in Thailand
land title and tenure security increased access to institutional credit
and thus led to greater capital formation.82 Field and Torero
examine the impact of a titling program in Peru, and they find that
title increased the loan approval rates from public lending
institutions.83 Title did not affect the loan approval rate from
private lending institutions, but conditional on receiving a loan,
interest rates were significantly lower.84 The 2005 World Bank
Development Report also asserts that “[f]armers with secure title in
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay, and Thailand
obtain larger loans on better terms than those without.”85
By contrast, in the case of Nicaragua, Laiglesia finds a linkage
between formal title documents and investment, but does not find
301 (2004) (discussing the role played by local officials in Ho Chi Minh City’s
informal property rights regime).
81 Id. at 298–99.
82 Feder & Onchan, supra note 20, at 318–20 (identifying a correlation between
possession of land title and capital formation and credit access).
83 Erica Field & Maximo Torero, Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access
Among the Urban Poor? Evidence from a Nationwide Titling Program 21 (Jan. 2004),
available
at
http://rwj.harvard.edu/papers/field/Field
percent20Do
percent20Property percent20Titles percent20Increase percent20Credit....pdf
(noting “strong positive relationship” between government loan approval and
holding formal title to property).
84 Id.
85 World Bank, supra note 4, at 81.
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that to be any evidence of greater availability of credit.86 MigotAdholla et al. similarly find no improvement in access to credit for
titled land in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa.87 Johnson
finds no evidence that Mexican farmers were asset-rationed out of
the credit market because they did not hold title.88 Carter and
Olinto reach a more nuanced result. In their analysis of Paraguay,
they find that the supply of credit is differentially available in
response to stronger title, as the credit supply effects of tenure
security are non-existent for small farms and only begin to become
important when farms are larger than fifteen hectares.89
Where informal credit markets exist and at least partially
substitute for the formal credit market, it seems that the
importance of title is significantly diminished. Pamuk examines
how informal credit arrangements emerged in Trinidad, which
serve the large section of the population without formal title.90
Similarly, André and Platteau describe how mortgages were
readily available in Rwanda from informal credit associations
known as tontines, which had sufficient authority to seize the
debtor’s lands in the event of a default, despite the absence of
formal title.91 Even Feder and Onchan, who are otherwise staunch
defenders of the theory that formal property rights can increase
access to credit, acknowledge that their evidence shows that the
impact of formal property rights on access to credit was negligible
in one Thai province which already had a well-developed informal
credit market.92

86 Juan R. de Laiglesia, Investment and Credit Effects of Land Titling and
Registration: Evidence from Nicaragua 22 (Research Comm. Dev. Econ., Working
Paper No. 10, 2005), available at http://opus.zbw-kiel.de/volltexte/2005
/3483/pdf/De_Laiglesia.pdf.
87 Migot-Adholla et al., supra note 76.
88 Nancy L. Johnson, Tierra y Libertad: Will Tenure Reform Improve
Productivity in Mexico’s Ejido Agriculture? 49 ECON. DEV. CULTURAL CHANGE 291,
304 (2001).
89 Michael R. Carter & Pedro Olinto, Getting Institutions “Right” for Whom?
Credit Constraints and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of
Investment, 85 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 173, 184 (2003).
90 Ayse Pamuk, Informal Institution Arrangements in Credit, Land Markets and
Infrastructure Delivery in Trinidad, 24 INT’L J. URBAN REG’L RES. 379, 381–89 (2000).
91 André & Platteau, supra note 78, at 21.
92 Feder & Onchan, supra note 20, at 315.
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The Empirics of Property Rights and Investment

As with the above considerations, the evidence linking formal
property rights to increased investment is mixed. On the one
hand, there are a number of studies in various settings which
suggest that formal property rights lead to increased investment.93
On a broad level, in a cross-country regression analysis, Svensson
finds that countries with stronger property rights had higher
investment rates.94 On a more micro level, Besley finds some
support for the linkage between investment and property rights in
Ghana.95 Similarly, Alston et al., in their analysis of land in the
Brazilian Frontier, conclude that title increases farm-specific
investment as well as land value.96 In his analysis of Guatemala,
Schweigert, after controlling for the availability of credit, found
that households with formal title generated greater output and
invested more family labor towards generating future
production.97
93 The linkage between formal property rights and investment presumes the
existence of a relationship between tenure security and investment, as the benefit
of formal property rights is that they are presumed to increase tenure security.
While the latter relationship has generally been found to be strong, not all studies
have found evidence of a strong relationship, at least where the investments are
relatively short-term. See Stein Holden & Hailu Yohannes, Land Redistribution,
Tenure Insecurity, and Intensity of Production: A Study of Farm Households in Southern
Ethiopia, 78 LAND ECON. 573, 583–87 (2002) (finding no evidence of a relationship
between perceived tenure security and the use of farm inputs in their study of
southern Ethiopia). Thus, in some cases the question of the degree of tenure
security may not have a significant impact on investment. However, while this
may be true at the margins, it seems theoretically implausible and empirically
incorrect to suggest that there is, at least at a broad enough level, no relationship
between tenure security and investment. In the extreme case, an individual who
knows with certainty that their property will be appropriated without
compensation tomorrow obviously has no incentive to make an investment that
will only provide a pay-off a week in the future.
94 Jakob Svensson, Investment, Property Rights and Political Instability: Theory
and Evidence, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 1317, 1336–37 (1998).
95 Besley, supra note 24, at 936.
96 Lee J. Alston et al., The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land
Titles on the Brazilian Frontier, 12 J. LAW ECON. ORG. 25, 57–58 (1996).
97 Thomas Schweigert, Land Title, Tenure Security, Investment, and Farm
Output: Evidence from Guatemala, 40 J. DEV. AREAS 115, 123 (2006). In an analysis of
tenure reform in West Bengal, Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak find that a
government registration program designed to guarantee sharecropper tenure
significantly increased agricultural productivity. While they speculate that a
major reason for this increase was that the increased security gave sharecroppers
appropriate incentives to invest in the land, their model did not allow for a precise
investigation of the causal mechanism linking increased tenure security and
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While most of the above studies have focused on security of
tenure in the agricultural context, there is similar evidence linking
tenure security to investment in urban settings. Field finds that
investment in housing increased significantly once title was issued
to slum-dwellers in Peru. She finds that this effect is independent
of increased access to credit, because there were similar increases
in investment among both those who received credit as well as
those who were rationed out.98 Struyk and Lynn reach a similar
conclusion in their analysis of housing investment in Manila.99
However, measures other than tenure formalization may also play
a major role in improving investment incentives. For example,
Varley argues that the provision of government services to
informal urban settlements can be an adequate substitute for actual
formalization programs, as both have the effect of increasing
perceived security of tenure.100
The investment decisions of firms may also be significantly
altered by the perceived security of property rights. For example,
in their examination of reinvestment rates of firms’ profits in
different countries in the former Eastern bloc, Johnson, McMillan
and Woodruff found that entrepreneurs reinvested less of their
retained earnings when they perceived their property rights to be
less secure.101
While the expectation of tenure security is almost certainly
linked to increased investment, mechanisms other than formal title
can in some cases be used to achieve that tenure security. For
example, Lanjouw and Levy find that while formal title increases
tenure security and the value of the land, they also find that
informal mechanisms can effectively substitute for those in certain

increased productivity. Abhijit V. Banerjee et al., Empowerment and Efficiency:
Tenancy Reform in West Bengal, 110 J. POL. ECON. 239, 240 (2002).
98 Erica Field, Property Rights and Investment in Urban Slums, 3 J. EUR. ECON.
ASS’N. 279, 280–81 (2005).
99 Raymond J. Struyk & Robert Lynn, Determinants of Housing Investment in
Slum Areas: Tondo and Other Locations in Metro Manila, 59 LAND ECON. 444, 453
(1983).
100 Ann Varley, The Relationship Between Tenure Legalization and Housing
Improvements: Evidence from Mexico City, 18 DEV. & CHANGE 463 (1987).
101 Simon Johnson et al., Property Rights and Finance, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1335,
1336 (2002). Cull and Xu conducted similar research in China and reached
broadly similar results. Robert Cull & Lixin Colin Xu, Institutions, Ownership, and
Finance: The Determinants of Profit Reinvestment Among Chinese Firms, 77 J. FIN.
ECON. 117, 117 (2005).
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situations.102 Both the increasing age of the community (indicative
of greater time for social norms to develop) and paying a
community organizer (a decentralized social order mechanism)
were found to reduce the value of title. Lanjouw and Levy thus
suggest that titling programs should be focused on new and
disorganized communities. Similarly, Brock examines customary
land tenure in Uganda and finds that in most parts of the country,
land tenure is relatively secure under customary law; at the very
least, customary law has not impeded the planting of coffee, which
is a long-term cash crop requiring the expectation of relatively
secure tenure.103 This suggests that the appropriate question in
determining whether a property regime gives efficient investment
incentives is not simply whether the property rights regime is a
formal or informal regime, but rather whether there are
mechanisms in place to provide property owners with a sufficient
perception of security to encourage efficient investment.
Moreover, the interpretation of the above papersthat formal
property leads to higher investment levelsmust be made with
some caution, as there are some papers which seem to suggest that
the causality between formal property rights and investment may
be reversed. There are two mechanisms through which this may
operate. First, it may be the case that investments in land are
actually made as a mechanism for improving tenure security rather
than as a result of it. Razzaz examines squatter settlements in
Jordan and concludes that parties would invest in their properties
in order to gain de facto property rights, since the state would be
less likely to demolish completed houses.104 Second, it may be the
case that individuals seek out greater tenure security once their
property is more valuable or they have made more investments,
rather than the reverse. In these circumstances, an endogeneity
102 Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip I. Levy, Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal
Property Rights in Urban Ecuador, 112 ECON. J. 986, 986 (2002).
103 B. Brock, Customary Land Tenure, ‘Individualization’, and Agricultural
Development in Uganda, 2 E. AFR. J. RURAL DEV. 1 (1969). It is important to note
that even within customary property regimes, there may be significant differences
in the perception of tenure security. In their study of agricultural investment in
the Gambia, Hayes et al. find that differences in landowners’ perceptions of their
rights over their land in customary law statistically and significantly impacted
their levels of investment in their land. Joseph Hayes, Michael Roth & Lydia
Zapeda, Tenure Security, Investment and Productivity in Gambian Agriculture: A
Generalized Probit Analysis, 79 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 369, 381 (1997).
104 Omar M. Razzaz, Examining Property Rights and Investment in Informal
Settlements: The Case of Jordan, 69 LAND ECON. 341, 352–53 (1993).
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bias may inflate the estimated impact of title on investment in
many studies. Antle et al. show that the positive effect on
investment decisions of titling are smaller when simultaneous
equations are used than single-equation models, which is
consistent with the idea that the causality is reversed.105 Brasselle
et al. similarly find that once the endogeneity bias is controlled for,
increased land rights do not significantly increase investment.106
2.1.4.4.

The Empirics of Property Rights and Resource
Competition

Although research in this area is limited, there does seem to be
cases of individuals and groups in an environment of insecure
property rights undertaking activities solely for the purpose of
protecting their property. As noted above, Razzaz describes how
squatters would attempt to erect permanent structures extremely
quickly between state bulldozing of their settlements.107 An even
more striking example of such an activity is examined by De Vany
and Sanchez, who examine the fertility decisions of ejiditarios
[residents and members of an ejido] living on communal ejidos
[lands farmed by cooperatives] in Mexico. They find evidence of
greater fertility among ejiditarios than among other landowners,
and they posit that those families choose to have more children
because of several advantages which children provide in terms of
securing larger property plots for those families.108 Although it is
difficult to estimate or quantify the inefficiencies resulting from the
above activities, they do show the existence of expenditures made
for the protection of property claims. Thus, insecure property
rights may lead to socially excessive investments, as individuals
use scarce resources on costly measures to attempt to enforce
property claims.
One attempt to quantify the magnitude of this inefficiency has
been undertaken by Erica Field in her examination of the effects of

105 John Antle et al., Endogeneity of Land Titling and Farm Investments: Evidence
from the Peruvian Andes (Aug. 2003) (working paper, on file with the Montana
State University Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics) available
at http://www.tradeoffs.montana.edu/pdf/titling.pdf.
106 Anne-Sophie Brasselle et al., Land Tenure Security and Investment Incentives:
Puzzling Evidence from Burkina Faso, 67 J. DEV. ECON. 373, 375 (2002).
107 Razzaz, supra note 104.
108 Arthur De Vany & Nicolas Sanchez, Land Tenure Structures and Fertility in
Mexico, 61 REV. ECON. & STAT. 67, 67–68 (1979).
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the titling program in urban Peru. Her study focuses on
quantifying the degree to which insecure tenure forces households
to spend time guarding their residences instead of working. She
finds that, after controlling for a variety of factors, newly-titled
households worked on average forty-five hours per week more
than non-titled households.109 Although one of the few studies of
its kind, Field’s work provides preliminary support for believing
that secure property rights may increase labor market
participation.
2.1.5.

Property Rights and Growth: The Case of China

China is an important case study in the examination of the
relationship between protection of property rights and economic
development, given that it has achieved dramatic rates of economic
growth despite weak formal property rights protection. Moreover,
because of the sheer size and diversity of China as well as
significant temporal and geographic variation in its policies, China
provides an excellent example of many of the issues highlighted
above. Because of its importance and its recent record of economic
growth, the case of China will be referred to throughout this
Article. This Section will examine many of the issues discussed
above in the context of three different aspects of economic activity
in China: rural land and agricultural production; urban housing
markets; and private enterprises.
2.1.5.1.

Agricultural Production in Rural China

In the years following the Chinese Revolution, the Chinese
government instituted massive social changes that significantly
impacted the agricultural sector. Private property in rural land
was effectively abolished by 1956, and rural agricultural
production was organized around communes or collectives.110
These changes provided rural inhabitants with limited incentives
to work and failed to increase agricultural production, as
individuals and families could not realize the benefits of increased
labor or investment. Similarly, because there were monitoring
costs for production team managers and such supervision was
consequently imperfect, there were limited penalties that
Field, supra note 28, at 36.
Samuel P.S. Ho & George C.S. Lin, Emerging Land Markets in Rural and
Urban China: Policies and Practices, 175 CHINA Q. 681, 682–83 (2003).
109
110

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

428

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 30:2

accompanied limited effort.111 Unsurprisingly from the perspective
of property rights formalists, grain production grew relatively
slowly between the early 1950s and the late 1970s.
This situation was altered dramatically with the introduction of
the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in the early 1980s.
Under the HRS, while the collective retained legal ownership of the
land, contracts were provided to farmers and their families to give
them use rights over the land through long-term leases. The initial
term of these leases were for five years, but the term was extended
to fifteen years in 1984 and then thirty years in 1993.112 Tenure
security was further strengthened in the 1998 revision of the Land
Administration Law (also called the Land Management Law),
which provided for thirty-year leases with strong restrictions on
when readjustments could be made.113 In 2002, the Rural Land
Contracting Law was passed, which strengthened farmers’ rights
by not only prohibiting land readjustments in all but the most
exceptional cases, but also by requiring the execution of written
contracts between the collective and farmers which spelled out
farmers’ rights.114 A new property law passed in 2007 further
strengthened land tenure by giving farmers the right to renew their
thirty-year leases upon expiry of the lease.115 Most recently,
proposals put forward in October 2008 seek to reinforce private
property rights by further strengthening tenure and by making it
easier for farmers to transfer their land.116

111 Justin Lin, The Household Responsibility System in China’s Agricultural
Reform: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 36 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE S199,
S206–08 (1988).
112 PETER HO, INSTITUTIONS IN TRANSITION: LAND OWNERSHIP, PROPERTY RIGHTS,
AND SOCIAL CONFLICT IN CHINA 6 (2005).
113 Land Administration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999), art. 14, LAWINFOCHINA (last
visited Nov. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Land Administration Law, 1998]; Ho &
Lin, supra note 110.
114 Law on Rural Land Contracting (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2002, effective Mar. 1, 2003) LAWINFOCHINA (last
visited Nov. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.); Zhu Keliang et al., The Rural Land Question in China:
Analysis and Recommendations Based on a Seventeen-Province Survey, 38 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 761 (2006).
115 Property Law (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., March 16, 2007,
effective October 1, 2007) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter Property Law]; Caught Between Right and Left, Town and Country,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2007.
116 Land Reform in China: Still Not to the Tiller, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2008.
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Although rural land rights have significantly varied over time
and between regions,117 some generalizations are possible
regarding the nature of the Chinese agricultural property regime.
On the one hand, these formal use rights fall short of the full
bundle of rights which most formalists advocate. For example,
although farmers have options regarding the cultivation of their
land, they are not permitted to convert the land to non-agricultural
use; this may impede the realization of certain potential efficiency
gains. Furthermore, the mortgaging of farmland continues to be
prohibited, thereby constraining the supply of rural credit.118
On the other hand, these use rights seem to provide many of
the protections that are associated with formal private property
rights regimes. Most importantly, subject to the conditions above
as well as certain implicit and explicit taxes, use rights are intended
to be relatively secure. Land markets are also theoretically
facilitated by these use rights, as they are transferable in a variety
of ways, including inheritance and lease.119 Land transfers within
the collective were formally permitted by the 1986 Land
Administration Law, and in 1998 amendments to the Land
Administration Law allowed for contracting of the land to those
outside the collective, provided a sufficient proportion of the
collective consented.120 Thus, even if formal ownership rests in the
collective, the legal framework of use rights seemingly provides
sufficiently strong claims to individuals to yield many of the
advantages of private property discussed above by the formalists.
There are, however, four reasons why even the formal use
rights held by rural Chinese would fail in practice to provide many
of the posited benefits of private property. First, administrative
redistribution of land by the village leadership is common, leading
to decreased tenure security. A 2005 survey found that 74.3
percent of villages had conducted at least one land redistribution
since the implementation of the HRS, while 55.0 percent of villages
had experienced two or more readjustments.121 This occurs most
117 Charles Krusekopf, Diversity in Land Tenure Arrangements Under the
Household Responsibility System in China, 13 CHINA ECON. REV. 297, 298–301 (2002).
118 ECONOMIST, supra note 115.
119 Weiguo Wang, Land Use Rights: Legal Perspectives and Pitfalls for Land
Reform, in DEVELOPMENT DILEMMAS: LAND REFORM AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN
CHINA 62 (Peter Ho ed., 2005).
120 Land Administration Law, supra note 113, art. 15; Ho & Lin, supra note
110.
121 Keliang et al., supra note 114, at 775.
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often in response to demographic changes, such as changes in
household size or labor supply.122
Although the central
government has issued directives against such redistribution and
occurrences of such redistribution have been decreasing, it remains
widespread.123 This may be the result of a continued perception by
many of land as a communal resource.124 Thus, given the
significant deviation between formal law and informal norms, it is
possible that the latter has undermined the former.
Second, especially in rural areas near towns and cities, there is
a significant risk of expropriation of rural land for development,
also decreasing tenure security.
The Chinese constitution
specifically allows the state to expropriate collective land—a power
that local officials have seemed to exercise with some frequency.125
Keliang et al. find that the number of expropriations of rural
farmland increased fifteen-fold between 1995 and 2005.126
Moreover, this expropriation often occurs without real
consultation, and the compensation provided is significantly less
than either the market value of the land or the amount needed to
compensate farmers for the loss of their livelihoods.127 Even this
meager compensation is sometimes not provided. Keliang et al.,
for example, find that only two-thirds of farmers actually received
compensation that was promised to them in return for
expropriation.128
Third, while land transfers are formally permissible, there
continue to be barriers to the development of an active market for
land. These include cultural taboos related to the commoditization
122 Loren Brandt et al., Land Rights in China: Facts, Fictions and Issues, 47 CHINA
J. 67, 70 (2002).
123 Wang, supra note 119. Indeed, Krusekopf suggests that the village leader,
rather than the central government, is the ultimate determiner of land relations in
a given village. Krusekopf, supra note 117.
124 James Kung, Choice of Land Tenure in China: The Case of a County with QuasiPrivate Property Rights, 50 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 793, 794 (2002).
125 Prior to 2004, the Chinese constitution permitted expropriation without
compensation.
Amendments introduced in 2004 require the payment of
compensation for any land expropriated or requisitioned. Compare XIAN FA art. 10
(1982) (P.R.C.) with XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.) (demonstrating the changes
made to the constitution regarding land expropriation and related compensation);
Ho & Lin, supra note 110.
126 Keliang et al., supra note 114, at 780.
127 Xiaolin Guo, Land Expropriation and Rural Conflicts in China, 166 CHINA Q.
422, 423 (2001).
128 Keliang, supra note 114, at 782.
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of land, the perception of the need for land as a form of social
insurance, and, in some areas, local prohibitions on the transfer of
land, despite its formal legality at the national level.
Finally, and more generally, rural peasants are generally
unable to access the legal system to enforce their rights. The court
system is largely out of reach of rural farmers, and in many cases
no written contracts or certificates were issued to farmers detailing
their entitlements to the use of a certain plot of land.129 Keliang et
al. find that, as of 2005, 36.8 percent of households had neither a
contract nor a certificate which provided written evidence of their
land rights.130 Potentially more disturbing is the poor quality of
these documents: only 10.4 percent of farmers possessed either a
contract or certificate which fully outlined their rights and
contained all the contractual provisions required by the legislative
and regulatory framework.131 As a result, there is often a
significant divergence between the formal rights and entitlements
of farmers and the treatment they receive from local officials.
While the transition from communal agricultural production to
the HRS brought significant growth in grain production, scholars
supporting a formal property rights regime predict that such
growth would be limited by continuing tenure insecurity.
Although grain production rose dramatically in the early 1980s—
this growth being largely attributed to the incentives that were
created by allowing farmers to internalize the benefits of increased
yields—growth began to slow in the mid-1980s; from 1985 to 1994,
grain output increased only 0.9 percent annually.132 Some scholars
have sought to explain the slowdown in the growth of grain in the
mid-1980s by arguing that the efficiency gains resulting from
partial privatization and increased labor input had been exhausted
and that further growth would require increased physical inputs to
agricultural production.133 Thus, while the internalization of
benefits associated with increased investment in labor and other

129 RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 483
(2002); see also id. ch. 7 (outlining general commentary on the inadequacies of the
judiciary).
130 Keliang et al., supra note 114, at 788.
131 Id. at 789.
132 Brandt et al., supra note 122, at 68.
133 Gershon Feder et al., The Determinants of Farm Investment and Residential
Construction in Post-Reform China, 41 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 1, 1–2
(1992).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

432

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 30:2

inputs had increased production to a point, further production
increases would require additional investment. They predicted
that tenure insecurity would dissuade farmers from making such
investments, especially those investments which had a relatively
long time-horizon.
Such analysis is challenged by some authors, however, who
contend that agricultural production continued to be strong
despite weak property rights.
These authors suggest that
agricultural growth remained strong through the 1980s, with the
stagnation in grain output largely caused by farmers switching
away from grain in favor of higher-valued crops.134 Moreover, in
the late 1990s, the rate of growth of grain production began to
accelerate again, and agricultural output has seen substantial
growth in recent years; this is consistent with the above reasoning,
as the government relaxed its price controls on grain in the early
1990s, thereby increasing the incentives for farmers to produce it.135
Indeed, rural economic growth throughout this period seems to
have been strong, with one author noting that real per capita net
income of rural residents rose by 63 percent between 1985 and
1997.136 Because of this seemingly unusual growth in the presence
of weak property rights, it is essential to examine the empirical
research which has been undertaken to determine what the
relationship is between security of tenure and agricultural growth
in the Chinese context.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the empirical record linking
agricultural output and security of tenure in China is mixed. On
the one hand, much of the empirical work has shown a linkage
between increased investment and stronger perceptions of tenure
security. Li, Rozelle, and Brandt, using the length of time which a
farmer has occupied a plot of land as a proxy for tenure security,
found that increased tenure security increases incentives for longterm land-saving investments, though not for short-term
investments.137 Deininger and Jin reach a similar result in

134 David K. Lambert & Elliot Parker, Productivity in Chinese Provincial
Agriculture, 49 J. AGRIC. ECON. 1, 16 (1998).
135 Id.
136 Jean C. Oi, Two Decades of Rural Reform in China, 159 CHINA Q. 616, 616
(1999).
137 Guo Li et al., Tenure, Land Rights, and Farmer Investment Incentives in China,
19 AGRIC. ECON. 63, 65 (1998); see also Hanan Jacoby et al., Hazards of Expropriation:
Tenure Insecurity and Investment in Rural China, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1420, 1421–22
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comparing Guizhou, a Chinese province which adopted a policy of
not redistributing land in response to demographic changes, with
other provinces which otherwise shared many similar
characteristics.138 Hu has similarly argued that the short time
horizons provided by the current land tenure system have led to
the presence of short-term resource mining and environmental
degradation.139 While none of these studies could address the
impact of formal title to land, they do indicate that increased
perceptions of security led to greater investment. The logical
conclusion of these arguments is that the increased security
provided by formal title would bring even greater benefits in terms
of investment, long-term planning, and resource management.
Indeed, Keliang et al. lend support to this thesis, finding that
households that had been issued contracts or certificates were
significantly more likely to undertake investments than those that
had not been issued contracts or certificates.140
While most empirical work has shown a strong linkage
between tenure security and investment, some studies have found
a rather limited connection between the degree of tenure security
and investment. For example, Feder et al. find no statistically
significant relationship between tenure security and investment in
farm-related capital, with tenure security being measured by
farmers’ assessment of the probabilities of a) the re-allocation of
land during the contractual period, and b) receiving the same plot
of land when the contract is renewed.141 Interestingly, Feder et al.
also find mixed results relating to access to credit. They find that
in certain areas, where there are constraints on the availability of
certain inputs, the lack of access to credit is not a significant
constraint on investment.142 Where inputs to production are
available, however, greater access to credit would increase farm
investment. Similarly, Guo Li, in a 1999 unpublished PhD
dissertation, provides a comprehensive overview of land rights
(2002) (supporting the assertion that increased tenure security increases the
incentives for long-term investments).
138 Klaus Deininger & Songqing Jin, The Impact of Property Rights on
Households’ Investment, Risk Coping, and Policy Preferences: Evidence from China, 51
ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 851, 852 (2003).
139 Wei Hu, Household Land Tenure Reform in China: Its Impact on Farming Land
Use and Agro-Environment, 14 LAND USE POL. 175, 179 (1997).
140 Keliang et al., supra note 114, at 812–13 tbls. 15–16.
141 Feder et al., supra note 133, at 22–23.
142 Id at 22.
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and their effects on investment in China in which he concludes that
while tenure security does increase the use of inputs and
production, the efficiency loss from less tenure security is not
large.143
These results suggest generally that although there might be
some efficiency loss from the lack of formal title, this efficiency loss
is not too large. This in turn suggests that the investment
incentives, which the formalists posit would arise from more
secure formal title, are limited. The question then arises as to why
there is already a strong degree of agricultural investment in China
without formal title. As Clarke points out, and as acknowledged
by many of the informalist scholars discussed above, it may be that
predictability and expectations, rather than formal rights per se,
are the most important determinants of investment and growth.144
He suggests that this explains the difference between Township
and Village Enterprises (TVEs), which despite their lack of formal
rights face limited risk of expropriation and have grown even more
quickly than grain output, and the agricultural sector, where the
risk of expropriation has historically been somewhat higher.145
This type of reasoning has parallels in the agricultural sector, as a
key determinant of agricultural investment may not be formal
rights, but rather farmers’ perception of predictability and
continued access to a given plot of land. Indeed, this same
reasoning may explain the early growth in agricultural
productivity despite somewhat unclear and insecure rights; despite
unclear formal legal entitlements, there is evidence that a majority
of farmers felt that their tenure was relatively secure.146 The above
reasoning also suggests, however, that agricultural growth might
have been even stronger if farmers had held even greater levels of
tenure security.

143 Guo Li, The Economics of Land Tenure and Property Rights in China’s
Agricultural Sector (Mar. 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford
University) (on file with author).
144 Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The
China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 97–100 (2003).
145 Id. at 100–07.
146 James Kai-sing Kung & Shouying Lui, Farmers’ Preferences Regarding
Ownership and Land Tenure in Post-Mao China: Unexpected Evidence from Eight
Counties, 38 CHINA J. 33, 50–51 (1997) (finding that, with the exception of two
countires, 61.9 percent of farmers were confident their plots would not be
redrawn prior to their contracts’ expiration).
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This type of predictability is often attributed to the strong social
norms, the importance of relationships (guanxi), and the corporatist
ethic present in rural China.147 It may be that strong social
relationships have operated as a substitute for the rule of law in
China; thus, within close-knit communities, the ongoing
relationships between villagers and the local government and
among the villagers themselves might provide a sufficient basis for
tenure security. Indeed, a significant level of social trust between
the local government and villagers would be consistent with the
observation that a significant number of villagers support
occasional land redistributions.
While tenure security has been a major source of debate in
Chinese land policy, the issue of the development of land markets
has also attracted attention. Land markets continue to be rather
underdeveloped, and many villages continue to prohibit land
transfers, despite laws to the contrary.148 While some informalists
have claimed that administrative reallocations of land are
necessary to ensure equity, Deininger and Jin have shown how
land rental markets are actually better than administrative
solutions in terms of both efficiency and equity considerations.149
In another paper, Deininger and Jin also find that the ability to
transfer land significantly increased long-term agricultural
investment.150 In comparing market and administrative land
allocation mechanisms, Carter and Yao find that equity concerns
trump efficiency considerations in administrative allocation. This
means that, over time, administrative reallocations could lead to
significant inefficiencies in land use.151

PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 470.
Krusekopf, supra note 117, at 305–07.
149 Klaus Deininger & Songqing Jin, Land Rental Markets as an Alternative to
Reallocation? Equity and Efficiency Considerations in the Chinese Land Tenure System
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2930, 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636292.
150 Deininger & Jin, supra note 138, at 864, 877.
151 Michael Carter & Yang Yao, Market Versus Administrative Reallocation of
Land: An Econometric Analysis, in DEVELOPMENTAL DILEMMAS: LAND REFORM AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN CHINA 151, 162–64 (Peter Ho ed., 2005).
147
148
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Housing in Urban China

The legal framework regulating urban housing in China has
been in a state of considerable flux in recent years.152 While private
housing predominated prior to 1949, the newly-established
Communist government sought to gradually replace private
housing with public housing. Thus, in 1957, the government
introduced the danwei (work-unit) system, under which most
housing was provided by individuals’ work-units.153 Various
levels of government also took steps over this period to bring much
of the privately-owned housing into the public sphere.154 Thus,
over this period, housing was generally conceived of as a welfare
benefit provided by one’s employer or the state rather than as a
tradable commodity.
Over time, this led to significant
inefficiencies. As rents were nominal, there was virtually no
private investment in housing, and the danwei system was not able
to provide a sufficient amount of housing for urban dwellers. Over
time, this led to drastic housing shortages; one government
estimate found a shortage of one billion square meters of housing

152 This section can only provide a brief overview of Chinese urban land law
and policy. For additional materials that discuss these issues in much greater
depth, see Qingshu Xie et al., The Emergence of the Urban Land Market in China:
Evolution, Structure, Constraints and Perspectives, 39 URB. STUD. 1375 (2002).
153 Yan Song et al., Housing Policy in the People’s Republic of China: An Historical
Review, in EMERGING LAND & HOUSING MARKETS IN CHINA 163, 164–68 (Chengri
Ding & Yan Song eds., 2005).
154 Id.; see also Yingshun Zhao & Steven C. Bourassa, China’s Urban Housing
Reform: Recent Achievements and New Inequities, 18 HOUSING STUD. 721, 728–29
(2003) (discussing the steps taken by the Jinin government to force private
homeowners to effectively turn their land over to the state). While the work-unit
and the state played increasingly dominant roles in housing allocation over this
period, it would be incorrect to say that private housing completely disappeared.
Id. at 725. However, as Wilhelm points out, China had no formal property law
until 1986. Thus, while there was some type of arrangement which resembled
private property during this period, it existed very much in a grey area of the law.
Katherine Wilhelm, Rethinking Property Rights in Urban China, 9 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 227, 239 (2004) (defining private property rights at the time as being
governed by “customary norms as demonstrated by actual practice” rather than
by law).
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in 1978.155 Moreover, because housing was tied to the work-unit,
population and labor mobility was significantly constrained.156
The transition towards a more market-based economy that
began in 1978 resulted in increased recognition and legal
protection of private property rights in urban housing. This has
not meant entirely abandoning non-price mechanisms of housing
allocation, such as employer-provided housing or other
administrative allocation mechanisms; by contrast, such
mechanisms have continued to play a significant role in providing
housing.157 However, it has meant allowing the development of a
private housing market through legal reforms designed to clarify
and strengthen property rights. The major legislation enabling the
development of a private land market was the 1988 Land
Administration Law, which specified that use rights to state-owned
land, such as urban land, could be allocated to individuals or
units.158 A 1990 regulation set the lengths of these use rights and

155 Song et al., supra note 153, at 168–69. In addition to housing shortages, the
administrative allocation of land led to significant distortions in land use more
generally, including large amounts of unused land and an unnecessarily high
proportion of industrial land. On this point, see Chengri Ding, Land Policy Reform
in China: An Assessment and Prospects, 20 LAND USE POL’Y 109 (2003).
156 Song et al., supra note 153, at 168.
157 See Ya Ping Wang & Alan Murie, Commercial Housing Development in Urban
China, 36 URB. STUD. 1475, 1485–87 (1999) (emphasizing that there has been
significant variation among regions and economic classes in terms of marketbased versus administrative allocations of land). For a detailed overview of this
two-track system as well as resulting inefficiencies, see Anthony Gar-On Yeh, The
Dual Land Market and Urban Development in China, in EMERGING LAND & HOUSING
MARKETS IN CHINA, supra note 153, at 163, 165–68. See also Xing Quan Zhang,
Urban Land Reform in China, 14 LAND USE POL’Y 187, 193–94 (1997) (offering
additional overview on the two-track system); Youqin Huang & William A. V.
Clark, Housing Tenure Choice in Transitional China: A Multilevel Analysis, 39 URB.
STUD. 7 (2002) (analyzing various institutional and socioeconomic causes of
inequalities in the two-track system).
158 Land Administration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., June 25, 1986, revised Dec. 29, 1988) art. 7, LAWINFOCHINA (last
visited Nov. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.). This Law was amended in 1998 and again in 2004.
See Land Administration Law, 1998, supra note 113 (amending the Land
Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China, previously revised at the
11th Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress
on August 28, 2004). Since 1982, the Chinese Constitution has provided that land
in cities is owned by the state. XIAN FA art. 10 (1982). Thus, only use rights, rather
than the actual ownership of the land itself, are allocated to individuals under the
Land Administration Law.
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also specified that these rights could in certain cases be transferred
or mortgaged.159
However, despite increased formal recognition of housing
rights in urban areas, many of the same sources of tenure
insecurity in rural farmland have similarly caused unsecure or
unclear property rights in urban areas. For example, significant
tenure insecurity—as well as the actual dislocation of millions of
individuals—has resulted from the fact that, under Chinese law,
there are very few barriers preventing the state from expropriating
land for construction or redevelopment.160 While the law requires
compensation for such expropriations, the local authorities that
determine the appropriate measure of compensation for
expropriation have generally provided compensation that falls
below the replacement cost of the property.161 Moreover, even to
the extent that individuals have legally-protected property rights,
individuals have often had significant difficulties asserting those
rights, as judges—who are typically financially beholden to local
authorities—have been reluctant to challenge decisions of local
governments.162
The 2007 Property Law may rectify some of these problems and
strengthen urban dwellers’ property rights, as it significantly
clarifies a variety of aspects of land use rights including, perhaps
most importantly, the types of compensation that are owed to

159 Interim Regulations Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right
to the Use of the State-owned Land in the Urban Areas (promulgated by the State
Council of the PRC, May 19, 1990, effective May 19, 1990) arts. 4, 12
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (P.R.C.). Later regulations further
clarified the transferability of use rights. See Provisional Rules on Administration
of Allocated Land Use Right (promulgated by the State Land Administration,
Mar. 8, 1992, effective Mar. 8, 1992) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 30, 2008)
(P.R.C.). For a more detailed overview of provisions of the Land Administration
Law as well as its problems and subsequent amendments, see William Valletta,
The Land Administration Law of 1998 and Its Impact on Urban Development, in
EMERGING LAND & HOUSING MARKETS IN CHINA, supra note 153, at 59.
160 See generally Wilhelm, supra note 154 (detailing the process by which the
state expropriates land from landowners). See also Land Administration Law,
1998, supra note 113, at art. 58; Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation
Management Regulations (promulgated by the PRC State Council, June 6, 2001,
effective Nov. 1, 2001) available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad
/index.phpd?showsingle=2335 (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.).
161 See Wilhelm, supra note 154, at 249 (noting that local governments have
wide discretion in determining compensation).
162 Id. at 236.
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those individuals whose property is requisitioned.163 However, it
remains to be seen whether this law will meaningfully strengthen
individuals’ security of tenure, as it appears that the principal
source of tenure insecurity is not the lack of legal rights but rather
the unenforceability of those rights.
From an economic development perspective, the formalization
of property rights measures appears to have had mixed success.
On the one hand, the use rights created by the 1988 law and
clarified by subsequent legislation and regulations have appeared
to generate a significant real estate boom and spur housing
development.164 However, because of remaining uncertainty in
property rights, as well the significant role still played by
administrative actors in allocating urban housing, significant
distortions remain in the urban housing market, including both
high vacancy rates as well as over-inflated housing prices.165
2.1.5.3.

The Growth of Chinese Businesses

Since the gradual move towards marketization began in 1978,
the growth of business in China has been dramatic. In the 1980s,
private enterprise was still viewed with suspicion by the state, and
the legal framework was exceptionally inhospitable to private
enterprise.166 The primary source of business growth during this
period was from organizations such as TVEs, which included
aspects of both public and private ownership, with some growth
also coming from household businesses and other cooperative
forms.167 TVEs were the most important source of economic
growth, and the Chinese state sought to encourage their
development by providing them with favorable tax treatment and
extending significant loans.168 In practice such organizations often

Property Law, supra note 115, art. 42.
Wilhelm, supra note 154, at 243–47; Xing Quan Zhang, Development of the
Chinese Housing Market, in EMERGING LAND & HOUSING MARKETS IN CHINA, supra
note 153, at 183, 185–89.
165 Zhang, supra note 164, at 189–94; see also Jieming Zhu, A Transitional
Institution for the Emerging Land Market in Urban China, 42 URB. STUD. 1369 (2005)
(discussing the evolution of property rights over state-owned urban land).
166 Vai Io Lo & Xiaowen Tian, Property Rights, Productivity Gains and Economic
Growth: The Chinese Experience, 14 POST-COMMUNIST ECONS. 245, 246–48 (2002).
167 YANLAI WANG, CHINA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION
152–55 (2003).
168 Lo & Tian, supra note 166, at 246–47.
163
164
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operated as private firms, but they formally maintained the
structure of a TVE because of the accompanying benefits.169
In 1988 private enterprises were provided with some degree of
legal recognition and protection. The constitution was amended in
April 1988 to permit the existence of the private sector and to
guarantee its rights.170 This was followed shortly thereafter by
provisional regulations of private enterprises. These regulations
formally provided some degree of protection for private
businesses’ property rights, specifying that private enterprises had
the right to own and transfer property.171
These initial moves were followed by further legal protections
in the 1990s. Forms of business organizations were clarified with
enactments of the first Company Law in 1993 and the Partnership
Law in 1997.172 This was followed in 1999 by a constitutional
amendment that further strengthened the property rights of
individuals and private enterprises.173 Over the period during
which these changes were occurring, the private sector’s share of
industrial output grew dramatically from 8 percent in 1988 to 38
percent in 1998.174 Moreover, foreign investment in China has also
increased dramatically since greater legal protections were
implemented.175
Despite a more hospitable legal framework than was present in
the 1980s, the protection of property rights has remained far from
perfect for Chinese businesses for a number of reasons, many of

Id.
XIAN FA art. 11 (1988) (P.R.C.); WANG, supra note 167, at 156.
171 Lo & Tian, supra note 166, at 249.
172 Id.
See Company Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1, 1994) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited
Nov. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.); Partnership Business Law (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 23, 1997, effective Aug. 1, 1997) LAWINFOCHINA
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (P.R.C.).
173 XIAN FA art. 11 (1999) (P.R.C.); Lo & Tian, supra note 166, at 249.
174 Lo & Tian, supra note 166, at 250.
Despite this significant growth in
private enterprise, state-owned enterprises continue to play a significant role in
the Chinese economy. For an overview of the important role of state-owned
enterprises in the Chinese economy as well as some of the problems of this
arrangement, see Harry G. Broadman, The Business(es) of the Chinese State, 24
WORLD ECON. 849 (2001). For a paper exploring the superior economic
performance of TVEs relative to state-owned enterprises, see Yusheng Peng,
Chinese Villages and Townships as Industrial Corporations: Ownership, Governance, and
Market Discipline, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1338 (2001).
175 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 463–64.
169
170
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which have been noted above. Since local governments tend to be
selective and self-interested in enforcing laws and regulations, the
enforcement of laws and the effective degree of protection of
property rights is much weaker than the legal framework would
suggest.176 Moreover, the lack of an unbiased and effective
judiciary has rendered many businesses unable to enforce their
rights.177 Finally, the predatory tendencies of various levels of
government have meant that businesses have been pressured or
otherwise forced to give up their assets to the state.178 Thus, as
Peerenboom concludes, “China’s legal system undeniably still falls
far short of any reasonable standards for rule of law,” and there are
still significant risks facing firms operating in China.179 The
question that then arises is how such dramatic economic growth
was possible without the security and clarity of formal property
rights.
One explanation offered for such remarkable economic growth
in the absence of strong formal property rights is the presence of
relational networks and guanxi, which substitute for formal
property rights regimes. For example, Weitzman and Xu argue
that the economic success of TVEs is best explained by the high
levels of trust among villagers in rural China, which allows
villagers to successfully run cooperative firms despite
exceptionally unclear property rights underlying such
organizations.180
Consistent with the informalist literature
discussed above, it may be that tight social networks and the
repeated-game nature of villager participation in TVEs have
allowed such organizations to flourish. However, while TVEs
generally have experienced significant economic success, some
authors have argued that economic performance would have been

176 David Wank, Producing Property Rights: Strategies, Networks, and Efficiency
in Urban China’s Nonstate Firms, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN
CHINA 248, 251 (Jean Oi & Andrew Walder eds., 1999).
177 Id.; PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 463–64.
178 Wank, supra note 176.
179 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 464.
180 Martin L. Weitzman & Chenggang Xu, Chinese Township-Village Enterprises
as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives, 18 J. COMP. ECON. 121, 136–41 (1994). For a paper
which fleshes out Weitzman & Xu’s analysis, see Xiaolin Pei, Township-Village
Enterprises, Local Governments and Rural Communities: The Chinese Village as a Firm
During Economic Transition, 4 ECON. TRANSITION 43 (1996).
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even stronger under better defined property rights,181 thus
suggesting that there may be limits to the economic growth
possible under unclear property rights.
Corporatist relationships between firms and various levels of
government and influential individuals have also played a key role
in the growth of Chinese firms.182 Even prior to the formal
legalization of private enterprises in 1988, quasi-private enterprises
were created under the guise of collective or co-operative
enterprises with local governments.183 Che and Qian argue that in
the face of a predatory state, such linkages between firms and local
government can be beneficial for both parties. By operating within
the governmental framework, the firm has greater security from
expropriation or seizure of its assets and profits, and costly
revenue hiding will decrease. Similarly, the government benefits
because such enterprises often make significant contributions to
public goods such as the provision of infrastructure.184 Similarly,
in his examination of TVE’s, Li asserts that where the regulatory
environment is unclear and the government might try to block
certain transactions, ambiguous property rights might actually be
more efficient than private property rights.185 Li argues that this is
the case because firms can gain political influence and help with
regulatory issues through fuzzy connections and a corporatist
arrangement with the local government. The government, on the
other hand, can use the TVE as a mechanism for achieving certain
policy goals, such as curbing unemployment.186 This suggests that
TVE’s nebulous ownership structure may actually provide greater
opportunities for growth than would strictly private firms.
The strength of informal relationships in China may also
explain certain aspects of the finance and governance of private
Chinese firms. For example, Allen, et al. note that publicly listed
181 See e.g., Chun Chang et al., Incentive Contracting Versus Ownership Reforms:
Evidence From China’s Township and Village Enterprises, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 414, 426
(2003) (concluding that “changing from collecting ownership to stock-based
ownership can bring about significant efficiency gains during the transition
period when market-supporting institutions are developing”).
182 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 430; WANK, supra note 176.
183 WANG, supra note 167, at 152–53.
184 Jiahua Che & Yingyi Qian, Insecure Property Rights and Government
Ownership of Firms, 113 Q. J. ECON. 467 (1998).
185 David D. Li, A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies:
The Case of the Chinese Non-State Sector, 23 J. COMP. ECON. 1 (1996).
186 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 486–87.
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companies perform much worse than privately held companies.
They explain the poor performance of the former through weak
securities regulation and ineffective corporate governance, while
they explain the stronger performance of the latter by citing strong
personal relationships which allow companies to raise money
easily through informal credit markets and which constrain
opportunistic corporate governance.187 This explanation accords
with the informalist literature examined above, as cooperative
relationships are obviously easier to sustain in the tight-knit
context of a family firm or small business than they are in the
detached environment of public corporations.188 Similarly, some
authors have argued that relational networks explain the
significant amount of foreign direct investment which has flowed
into China despite the absence of strong formal institutions.189
While guanxi and corporatist linkages may provide some
degree of property protection in an insecure environment, they
also have a number of drawbacks which may ultimately slow the
growth of business.190 First, in some cases, otherwise inefficient
firms may survive because of local government support, thereby
straining government resources and allowing inefficient firms to
survive.191 Second, the integration of businesses with political
entities means that the success of a business may be more
dependent on an individual’s political connections than on the true
profitability of the enterprise.192 Third, property protections based
on such connections may present opportunities for corruption and
rent-seeking.193 Fourth, extensive reliance on such linkages may
undermine efforts at promoting the rule of law in the long term.194
187 Franklin Allen et al., Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China, 77 J. FIN.
ECON. 57 (2005).
188 This position is also consistent with, though not identical to, Burkart, et
al.’s argument that where protections for minority investors are weak, firms will
be owned and managed by the same individuals; i.e. family firms will be the
norm. See Mike Burkart et al., Family Firms, 58 J. FIN. 2167 (2003).
189 See e.g., Hongying Wang, Informal Institutions and Foreign Investment in
China, 13 PAC. REV. 525 (2000).
190 See generally MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF
DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOCRACY 180–81 (2006) (warning that the lack of reform
measures encourages, among other severe economic consequences, bad loans
which threaten the country’s entire financial sector).
191 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 470–71.
192 Wank, supra note 176, at 262.
193 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 472.
194 Id.
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Finally, personal relationships simply might not provide
sufficiently strong protection of property rights in many cases.
Thus, although corporatist arrangements can substitute for formal
property rights to some extent, they can create substantial social
costs which could be avoided by a strong formal property rights
regime.
2.2. The Costs of a Formal Property Rights Regime
2.2.1.

Monetary Cost

While the formalists may be correct about the efficiency gains
which arise from formal property rights, some scholars contend
that those efficiency gains may, in some circumstances, be
outweighed by the costs of creating and enforcing the property
rights regime. As Demsetz pointed out, the costs of creating and
maintaining a formal property rights regime can outweigh the
benefits arising from the regime, especially in cases where land is
relatively abundant.195 Anderson and Hill similarly note that
“[e]stablishing and protecting property rights is very much a
productive activity toward which resources can be devoted. But,
like any other activity, the amount of this investment will depend
on the marginal benefits and costs to investors of allocating
resources to these endeavors.”196
With respect to creating a formal regime, there are a variety of
initial costs, including surveying land, creating a title registry,
adjudicating conflicting claims, etc. As Banner points out, the
transaction costs associated with valuing and allocating rights can
be extremely high in the transition from one property rights regime
to another.197 In a survey of various papers which attempt to
quantify the direct costs of creating land registration systems,
Hanstad notes that land registration has been in some cases as
expensive as $240 per parcel.198 Moreover, there may be additional
indirect costs in educating people about the benefits and mechanics

Demsetz, supra note 11, at 350–53.
Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of
the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 165 (1975).
197 Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 359,
364–65 (2002).
198 Hanstad, supra note 27, at 664–65.
195
196
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of titling, without which the informal system may continue to
prevail.
Once the regime is created, there are ongoing costs required to
maintain it. While land registries, either in the form of deed
recording systems or title registries,199 provide the greatest degree
of security and clarity, they also require continual updating and
maintenance, thereby creating a number of ongoing costs. These
costs can often outweigh the benefits supposedly derived from
formal property rights.
The costs may also differ depending on the nature of the
property in question. As Baland and Platteau note, the relative
costs of maintaining and enforcing a property regime increase as
the physical space which that resource occupies increases.200 This
suggests that especially in areas where land is used extensively
rather than intensively—such as grazing land for animals—the
costs of enforcing private property rights may be high relative to
the benefits.
2.2.2.

Social Insurance and Equity

Where communal land has traditionally played a role as a
collective insurance mechanism, the titling of that land might
eliminate that mechanism while not replacing it with anything
Richard Posner examines a number of insurance
else.201
mechanisms in traditional societies and argues that traditional
institutions, such as communal land or frequently redistributed
land, can be efficient in some circumstances.202 Baland and
Francois formally model the insurance function of communal land
and show that where there exist incomplete insurance markets

Hanstad, supra note 27, at 650–51.
Jean-Marie Baland & Jean-Philippe Platteau, Division of the Commons: A
Partial Assessment of the New Institutional Economics of Land Rights, 80 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 644, 645 (1998).
201 Rohini Pande & Christopher Udry, Institutions and Development: A View
from Below 25–30 (Yale Univ. Econ. Growth Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 928, 1999),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=864044; Michael
J. Trebilcock, Communal Property Rights: The Papua New Guinean Experience, 34 U.
TORONTO L.J. 377 (1984). For a discussion of some of the geographical conditions
under which the communal property arrangements are efficient, see Jeffrey B.
Nugent & Nicolas Sanchez, Common Property Rights as an Endogenous Response to
Risk, 80 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 651 (1998).
202 Richard Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law,
23 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1980).
199
200
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because of either information asymmetries or limits on contract
enforcement—two very plausible conditions in many developing
countries—if individuals are sufficiently risk averse and the
efficiency gains from privatization are sufficiently limited,
privatization of communal land can be welfare-decreasing.203 By
contrast, Platteau argues that population pressures will naturally
lead to the erosion of this insurance function,204 but he also
acknowledges that the individualization of land tenure rights can
be a separate force which leads to this outcome.205
Related to this problem is the emergence of a landless class,
which is much less likely where land is redistributed.206 André and
Platteau show how mounting population pressures and the
development of informal land markets in Rwanda led to distress
sales and the growth of a landless class.207
This issue has been studied in the Chinese context, where a
body of literature suggests that some Chinese farmers actually
seem to prefer periodic redistribution because of the social
insurance function which such redistribution plays. For example,
Kung and Liu claim that almost two-thirds of the farmers they
surveyed were opposed to stable tenure in the form of thirty-year
land contracts.208
Interestingly, Deininger and Jin have documented a type of
learning effect, as households in an area which exogenously
introduced greater tenure security were, ceteris paribus, generally
more in favor of tenure security than those elsewhere.209 Kung
examined the village of Meitan in Guizhou province, the same
province that Deininger and Jin studied, and actually found a
203 Jean-Marie Baland & Patrick Francois, Commons as Insurance and the
Welfare Impact of Privatization, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 211 (2005); see also DEININGER, supra
note 5, at 29–30 (arguing that local communities can provide some insurance value
because unlike centralized bureaucracies, they have better access to private
information).
204 For a discussion of this point in Rwanda, see André & Platteau, supra note
78.
205 Jean-Philippe Platteau, The Gradual Erosion of the Social Security Function of
Customary Land Tenure Arrangements in Lineage-Based Societies 26 (World Inst. for
Dev. Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 2002/26, 2002), available at
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/plj01/plj01.pdf.
206 Platteau, supra note 22, at 65–69; Deininger & Feder, supra note 18, at 2–3;
Hanstad, supra note 27.
207 André & Platteau, supra note 78, at 24–29.
208 Kung & Liu, supra note 146, at 54.
209 Deininger & Jin, supra note 138, at 864.
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contrary result, finding that the introduction of more secure tenure
had actually caused some in Meitan to oppose tenure security in
favor of periodic reallocations.210 Not surprisingly, those who
continued to favor tenure security were those that had benefited
from it, i.e., older families who had previously been assigned large
amounts of land.
2.2.3.

Undermining Informal Mechanisms of Tenure Security

In undertaking a cost-benefit analysis of a formal property
rights regime, it is important to take into account the effect that
formalization has on informal norms. In certain situations, the
institutionalization of new formal norms can damage or disrupt
informal norms. A theoretical account of this is given by Pildes,
who notes that state action can undermine norms through three
broad processes: by destroying the social conditions that enable
reciprocity; through direct attacks on the norms of reciprocity; and,
with failures by the state to appreciate the broad context in which
norms emerge.211 Similarly, Kahan shows how governmental
incentive schemes can be seen as a social cue that individuals are
not inclined to cooperate voluntarily, and legislation can actually
weaken social norms.212
Applied to the context of property, these theories suggest that
the formalization of title may potentially undermine norms of
voluntary respect and cooperation for tenure security, thereby
leading to less secure property rights. This is especially true if
there are substantial transaction costs for the individuals seeking to
enforce them. Moreover, as Lanjouw and Levy note, “if one takes
an area with a long-standing and well-understood customary
property rights system and overlays a formal state titling program,
it can make residents less secure because they are unsure which
system will apply in any given situation.”213 For example,
Besteman notes that customary land tenure in Somalia was quite

210 Kung, supra note 124, at 798 (noting that surveys indicated a three-fold
increase—from 16 percent to 48 percent of those surveyed—in those preferring
land reassignment to stable land tenure during this period).
211 Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 2055, 2067–73 (1996).
212 Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102
MICH. L. REV. 71, 76 (2003).
213 Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip Levy, A Difficult Question in Deed: A Cost-Benefit
Framework for Titling Programs, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 889, 905 (2004).
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secure and that titling programs actually decreased security by
calling into question the applicability of customary law and by
creating the possibility of dispossession of unregistered farmers
who continued to abide by customary law.214 There is also some
evidence which suggests that land held under customary tenure
may be less prone to land conflicts than land held under newer
alternative forms of tenure, because the former is viewed as more
legitimate than the latter.215 Cases have also been noted where the
formalization of property rights has undermined traditional
resource management arrangements. For example, Jodha has
documented how changes in village governance structures in parts
of India and the privatization of certain plots of land have
undermined traditional arrangements for the efficient management
of common property resources.216
A related problem in the property context is that the
formalization of individual property rights may erode the rich and
often disaggregated bundles of customary entitlements to land. As
Banner notes, while in contemporary developed countries land is
primarily allocated on a spatial basis, there have been, and
continue to be, numerous property rights regimes where property
rights are allocated on a functional basis.217 Because customary
practices often provide different owners with different rights to the
same land—such as the right to grow cash crops, the right to graze
cattle, the right to gather firewood, the right to use streams on the
land for water, the right to traverse, etc.—the creation of exclusive
individual rights can undermine traditional activities which
depended on this (by Ellickson’s hypothesis, probably socially
efficient) property rights division.218 Put differently, the transition
214 Catherine Besteman, Individualisation and the Assault on Customary Tenure
in Africa: Title Registration Programmes and the Case of Somalia, 64 AFR.: J. INT’L AFR.
INST. 484, at 498–99 (1994).
215 See Klaus Deininger & Raffaella Castagnini, Incidence and Impact of Land
Conflict in Uganda, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 321, 336 (2006) (discussing how the
application of customary law in Uganda leads to less conflicts when compared to
the newer formal titling system instituted by the 1998 Land Act).
216 N. S. Jodha, Depletion of Common Property Resources in India: Micro-level
Evidence, 15 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 261, 262 (1989); see also N. S. Jodha, Population
Growth and Decline of Common Property Resources in Rajasthan, India, 11 POPULATION
& DEV. REV. 247 (1985).
217 Banner, supra note 197, at 365.
218 See Platteau, supra note 22, at 71–73 (discussing the importance of
community based solutions in sub-Saharan Africa where property rights are
divided on a use basis); see also María E. Fernández-Giménez, Spatial and Social
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from a functional to a spatial property system can entail significant
costs and necessitate significant and potentially deleterious social
reorganization. While it is possible, theoretically, to formalize a
functional property system and disaggregate all the rights over a
certain piece of land, this would almost certainly be prohibitively
costly, both to record the various rights initially as well as to keep
track of various changes over time.219
2.2.4.

Social Unrest

There may also be externalities to the process of assigning
property rights in the form of social conflict.220 In addition to the
possibility of conflict caused by the perceived illegitimacy of a new
tenure system, there are two additional mechanisms through
which formalizing land tenure can lead to social conflict. First,
proponents of titling and registration programs often implicitly
assume that boundaries between property rights are clearly
defined. However, if such boundaries are undefined or fuzzy,
titling programs can cause conflicting claims to the rights to
surface.221
Two attempts by the Australian government to
formalize land rights in Papua New Guinea created new land
disputes, as individuals were concerned about losing customary
entitlements and the accompanying finality of land holdings that
resulted from the registration process.222 Returning to the Chinese
case study, Ho argues that China has deliberately maintained a
degree of legal ambiguity in its property rights arrangements in
order to minimize conflict between groups and to allow for further
Boundaries and the Paradox of Pastoral Land Tenure: A Case Study from Postsocialist
Mongolia, 30 HUM. ECOLOGY 49, 50 (2002) (discussing how the spatial allocation of
land in Mongolia is difficult because “spatial and social flexibility are intrinsic and
essential characteristics of resource use patterns”).
219 See Platteau, supra note 22, at 58 (noting that disaggregating use rights
would be prohibitively costly in countries such as Zambia and Rwanda).
220 See Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The
Third World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1009 (2006) (noting that
those such as Demsetz and Coase who push for property rights as a way to
internalize externalities “overlook the possibility that the allocation process will
create its own externalities in the form of social conflict”).
221 See Hanstad, supra note 27, at 666 (nothing that formalization of title when
significant fragmented holdings existed created significant problems for Sicilian
and Chinese landowners).
222 Trebilcock, supra note 201, at 413 (noting that the very act of embarking on
land registration precipitated disputes due to the “once and for all” nature of land
registration).
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development of property institutions in the future.223 Whether or
not this has actually limited conflict is unclear, as land disputes
have become increasingly frequent in rural China.224
Second, where titling programs transfer title from absentee
landholders to occupants instead of simply titling untitled state
land, a relatively simple formalization program can encourage
invasions by squatters. In their study of land reform in the
Brazilian rainforest, Alston et al. found that a government program
designed to expropriate unused land from large landowners and
transfer it to peasants actually increased land conflict by
encouraging peasants to invade and squat on land and assert
claims to this land under the principles of the government’s
redistributive land policies.225
Thus, while a strong formal
property rights regime can prevent conflict and wasteful
competition for resources once such a regime is successfully
instituted, the process of creating and formalizing such a regime
can itself lead to significant conflict, at least in the short term.
2.2.5.

The Flaws of a Titling Process

In other circumstances, the titling process itself can be carried
out in such a way as to further marginalize already disenfranchised
groups.226 Two such groups have been the focus of substantial
study. First, titling programs which destroy customary tenure can
significantly erode women’s rights. This can occur for a number of
reasons. The titling process will often provide title to land solely to
men, while women will lose their customary rights.227 LastarriaHO, supra note 112, at 73.
See PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 482–83 (discussing a recent land survey
where many farmers felt insecurity in their tenure over their land).
225 Lee J. Alston et al., A Model of Rural Conflict: Violence and Land Reform Policy
in Brazil, 4 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 135, 136 (1999).
226 See generally Jean-Philippe Platteau, The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights
as Applied to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Assessment, 27 DEV. & CHANGE 29, 39–46
(1996) (arguing that land registration increases certainty but tends to deprive
access to marginalized groups, reducing efficiency and security, and is feared to
be manipulatable by the elite and educated to their advantage).
227 See Besteman, supra note 214, at 495 (noting that once formal titling was
instituted in Somalia, the cultural rights that women were once guaranteed under
the Sharia were largely ignored); Carmen Diana Deere & Magdalena León, Who
Owns the Land? Gender and Land-Titling Programmes in Latin America, 1 J. AGRARIAN
CHANGE 440, 443 (2001) (noting that the most successful programs were those
which came from nations such as Colombia, Honduras, and Nicaragua where
women’s rights are independently protected); Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel, Impact of
223
224
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Cornheil notes that the move to a market for land may
disenfranchise women as the market may not be gender-neutral.
She points out that not only are there often institutionalized male
biases against women owning land, but women also enter the
market at a disadvantage due to their lack of cash or access to
credit, lack of political power, and the fact that they have a family
to maintain.228 Finally, the transition from a functional to a spatial
property regime, as discussed above, can be particularly
devastating for women, whose livelihood often depends
significantly on certain limited use rights, such as rights to collect
wood and access to grazing land.229 However, whether titling
programs strengthen or weaken women’s rights depends on the
implementation of the titling program as well as the strength of
supporting institutions for women’s rights.
Where legal
protections are otherwise strong for women, programs such as
joint titling may actually strengthen their position relative to
customary law.230
The empirical evidence assessing the impact of titling programs
on women’s rights is somewhat mixed. While in some cases titling
has eroded women’s customary rights, this has largely depended
on how the titling program was carried out. Deere and Leon’s
study is illustrative. They provide an overview of four different
titling programs in Latin America and find mixed results, largely
varying on how the program was executed and to what extent the
program provided adequate legal protections for women rather
than on the effect of titling itself.231 Gopal provides an account of

Privatization on Gender and Property Rights in Africa, 25 WORLD DEV. 1317, 1320
(1997) (explaining how colonial lands switched from traditional tenure ownership
in pre-colonial Africa with a greater variety of gender patterns, to personal
property held by the head of the household).
228 Lastarria-Cornhiel, supra note 227, at 1326–27.
229 See Thea Hilhorst, Women’s Land Rights: Current Developments in SubSaharan Africa, in EVOLVING LAND RIGHTS, POLICY AND TENURE IN AFRICA 181, 185
(Camilla Toulmin & Julian Quan, eds., 2000) (describing the characteristics of
female employment working the land, including their lack of incentives to
develop the land, and what factors influence the extent of their agriculture
activities).
230 See Aili Mari Tripp, Women’s Movements, Customary Law, and Land Rights in
Africa: The Case of Uganda, 7 AFR. STUD. Q. 1, 11 (2004) (describing the push/pull
effects of legal land rights and community-oriented ideals).
231 Deere & Leon, supra note 227, at 443 (discussing how the implementation
of formal titling programs in several Latin American countries has significantly
undercut many women’s rights to land).
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the impact of land reform on women in Kenya and Ethiopia and
finds similarly mixed results.232 In Kenya, she finds that land
tenure reform damaged women’s customary usufructury rights by
not providing any adequate safeguards, thereby turning them into
an “agrarian proletariat.”233 In Ethiopia, the land reform program
was somewhat more successful, although by 1996, still only 18
percent of landowners were female.234 Firmin-Sellers and Sellers,
however, come to a more pessimistic conclusion in their study of
Cameroon. They note that while customary rights granted women
ownership over food crops and men ownership rights over tree
crops, the titling process has tended to marginalize women’s
claims as titles over the property were almost entirely granted to
men.235
Second, even in circumstances where the titling process would
provide substantial benefits along the lines discussed by the
formalists, differential access to formal titling because of
differences in education, wealth, or political power can create
inequitable results and actually dispossess individuals of their
land.236 Even where registration is theoretically equally accessible
to all, rural landowners may be misinformed and not fully
understand the benefits of registration; conversely, elites may be
able to manipulate the system and claim rights over large portions
of land. Moreover, in cases where there is any charge for titling—
or even when there are large indirect costs for registration, such as
the requirement to travel a significant distance to the capital to
register the land—wealthy elites will be significantly better
positioned than the poor to reap the benefits from titling programs.
There is indeed evidence that titling programs have in some
cases disproportionately benefited the elites of a given society at
the expense of the poor. Feder and Noronha cite a number of
studies indicating that it was chiefs and civil servants who had
superior knowledge of the law that benefited from land

232 GITA GOPAL, WORLD BANK, GENDER–RELATED LEGAL REFORM AND ACCESS TO
ECONOMIC RESOURCES IN EASTERN AFRICA 2–3 (1999).
233 Id. at 12–13.
234 Id. at 13.
235 Kathryn Firmin-Sellers & Patrick Sellers, Expected Failures and Unexpected
Successes of Land Titling in Africa, 27 WORLD DEV. 1115, 1119 (1999).
236 See Platteau, supra note 22, at 67–68 (discussing how the high level of
wealth concentration in new formal title systems has led to a further concentration
of wealth).
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registration in Kenya.237 Similar manipulation was documented by
Doornbos in Uganda’s titling program.238 However, it should be
noted that, as with the discussion of the impact of titling on
women’s rights, it is not titling itself which necessarily leads to this
deleterious effect, but rather the manner in which it is carried out.
While titling programs need not lead to the further marginalization
of already marginalized groups, the impact of such programs on
those groups cannot be ignored, as improperly designed programs
can have deleterious consequences.
2.3. Concluding Remarks on the Costs and Benefits of a Formal
Property Rights Regime
The above discussion of the costs and benefits of a formal
property rights regime suggests that the picture is much more
complex than many commentators and policy-makers have
assumed. The creation of a formal property rights regime is not
costless, and it will not necessarily be the case that the benefits of
such a regime will clearly outweigh the costs. Given, however,
that formal property regimes are ubiquitous in the developed
world, there are reasons to believe that at a certain stage in a
country’s economic development, a formal property rights regime
is necessary to secure further economic development.239
At low levels of development, an informal regime may be
adequate to realize many of the benefits of private property.
Where economic life is largely organized around small units such
as the village, the mobility of the population is low, and resources
such as land are not overly scarce, informal mechanisms will likely
be sufficient to provide the benefits of private property. Put
differently, if individuals expect to be living in the same location,
expectations of repeated interactions will create the conditions
necessary for cooperation. At this point, informal mechanisms will
likely suffice to bring the benefits of private property, so a formal

Feder & Noronha, supra note 58, at 156–57.
Martin R. Doornbos, Land Tenure and Political Conflict in Ankole, Uganda, 12
J. DEV. STUD. 54, 63 (1975).
239 Indeed, this view seems consistent with China’s experience over the last
three decades. As discussed above, supra Section 2.1.5, China experienced rapid
growth throughout the 1980’s without clear property rights. However, as
economic development has progressed, China has increasingly tried to create a
functioning formal property rights system.
237
238
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property regime would entail significant social and economic costs
without significant benefits.
As countries undergo economic changes, however, the relative
benefits of a formal private property regime are likely to increase.
There are three general reasons for this consequence. First, as
development increases, communities are likely to become less
close-knit, leading informal norms to be less effective in
maintaining order. As Feder and Feeny note, “[w]ith more
advanced stages of development and increased mobility of
individuals and entrepreneurs, transactions among individuals
who are not members of the same community are more
frequent.”240 Where the proportion of one-off encounters increases
relative to continuing encounters, traditional methods of social
cohesion are likely to be strained. Moreover, as Posner notes,
while informal norms can often result in a strong degree of security
for items which can be easily possessed, such norms will be
inadequate to protect goods which individuals cannot directly
possess, such as land or capital dispersed throughout a number of
locations.241
Second, at higher levels of economic development, the value of
land, goods, and investments may increase substantially, leading
to more substantial benefits from more secure property rights.
While informal mechanisms may be sufficient to provide an
individual with the incentives to make minor investments, more
capital-intensive, asset-specific investments will likely require
greater certainty and security. Moreover, as the activities become
increasingly capital-intensive, formal credit is likely to play a
greater role in economic development, thereby increasing the
benefits of clear and secure title.
Third, at higher levels of economic development, the relative
costs of creating a formal property regime may be lower. As a
country’s tax base increases, it will be relatively easier for the state
to make the expenditures required for creating a formal property
regime. Where insurance markets are likely to be more developed,
the loss of the insurance function of customary land tenure is likely
to be less severe. Similarly, where the state takes an increasingly
large role in providing social benefits to its population, the equity
Feder & Feeny, supra note 17, at 140.
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 56, at 178–79 (illustrating how
“state intervention has raised welfare beyond the level produced by the evolution
of norms” using possession-based resources as an example).
240
241
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concerns of potential landlessness are likely to be mitigated.
Finally, the very forces that undermine informal tenure can also
mitigate the effects of increased landlessness and social unrest. As
mobility and migration opportunities increase, individuals will be
more able to seek alternative economic opportunities elsewhere,
thus lowering the cost to individuals of changes to property
arrangements.
The above considerations suggest that the focus of certain
previous titling programs may have been misguided both in terms
of the targets of these titling programs as well as in the content of
the formalization program. First, while many titling programs
have focused on providing formal title to agricultural landowners,
the above discussion suggests that, with the exception of newlysettled frontier land, established social norms in rural areas may be
sufficient to provide an adequate degree of informal property
rights protection. Urban titling programs, especially those aimed
at newly-developing squatter settlements, may yield a greater
social return. The greatest return from titling programs may come,
however, from providing formal ownership to firms’ land and
assets, as informal norms may be lacking in such circumstances or
inadequate to provide the certainty required for large investments
or transactions entailing significant sunk costs and long pay-off
periods. Second, to the extent that there are substantial benefits to
providing stronger land rights to agricultural landowners in a
given case, those benefits may be largely realized through the
recognition and formalization of customary land tenure.242 This
model of formalization in the agricultural sector may bring about
the benefits of security of tenure at a lower social cost than would
the de novo creation of an individual-centered system of land rights.
Both of these conclusions, however, should be taken only as
general propositions, as the above discussion highlights how the
analysis of relative costs and benefits of formalization is a highly
context-dependent exercise.
242 For an insightful exploration of many of these issues of institutional
design, see Daniel Fitzpatrick, ‘Best Practice’ Options for the Legal Recognition of
Customary Tenure, 36 DEV. & CHANGE 449 (2005), which argues that conventional
law-and-economics theory fails to explain the development of open access in
many Third World property systems and that rising resource values are more
likely to lead to open access than private property when the institutional
environment is characterized by competing legal and norm-based systems. See
generally DEININGER, supra note 5, at 62–65 (describing situations when eliminating
or replacing customary tenure is neither necessary nor desirable).
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Finally, it should be noted that while the above discussion has
largely focused on titling, the examples show that in some cases the
primary source of insecure property rights is not the threat of
expropriation by other households or landowners, but rather from
expropriation by the state.243 Where this is the main source of
insecurity, formal title per se may not be necessary to increase
individuals’ perceptions of tenure security. Moreover, under such
circumstances, formal title may not actually improve perceptions
of tenure security, if individuals believe that they will not be able
to enforce their property rights against a predatory state.244 Rather,
what is required in such cases to create the perception of strong
property rights is a credible commitment by the state not to
expropriate land or other assets.245 This can be a significantly less
costly and more effective mechanism for gaining the benefits of
private property rights than formal titling programs.
3.

THE PRECONDITIONS FOR A FORMAL PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIME

A property rights regime does not exist in a vacuum, but rather
its operation depends on its interactions with a number of related
social institutions. This Section will examine the social, market,
and state institutions which are conducive to or necessary for the
operation of a formal property rights regime. Stated most
generally, this Section will note that people may ignore the formal
legal mechanisms and continue to adhere to informal norms if they
find the latter to be more efficient and cost effective.246 A basic
243 See Timothy Frye, Credible Commitment and Property Rights: Evidence from
Russia, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 453, 456–458 (2004) (noting that one of the largest
threats to property rights in Russia was a fear that the state would expropriate
private property); see also Razzaz, supra note 104 (discussing the Bani-Hassan
tribe’s fear of expropriation from the Jordanian government). Various levels of
government have been significant sources of property rights insecurity in China;
for examples see supra text accompanying notes 122–24, 177.
244 See Frye, supra note 243, at 457–58 (describing a survey of Russian
businessmen finding that many believe that they will not be able to enforce their
property rights against the state).
245 See FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 12, at 97–100 (discussing the
implications of state ownership of land and farmers’ incentives to work).
246 See ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 51, at 15–28 (commenting
on the irrelevance of formal law to the Shasta county ranchers); see also DE SOTO,
supra note 7, at 154 (noting that in Peru extralegal entrepreneurs continue to work
because it is more cost effective than actually complying with regulations); Feder
& Noronha, supra note 58, at 163 (concluding that in certain circumstances
societies that are not ready for formal titling should remain with communal
systems so long as it is more cost effective); Pande & Udry, supra note 201, at 14
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point made by many authors—and stressed by De Soto—is that
individuals will be more likely to continue to operate in the
informal sector as the relative cost of operating in the formal sector
increases.247
3.1. Informal Norms
Because the state can neither perfectly enforce all of its laws nor
can citizens turn to the state for complete enforcement of their
rights, the success and effectiveness of a formal legal system
depends heavily upon the relationship between law and social
norms. Law and social norms can in some circumstances be
complementary. This is particularly the case when the law
This does not
formalizes generally accepted practices.248
necessarily imply legal or normative stagnation; incremental or
marginal deviations in the law from social norms can play a role in
gradually modifying those norms, thereby suggesting a potential
path for reform.249 Some authors have noted the existence of legal
obedience norms.250 If individuals have internalized such a norm,
then they may use the formal legal system, if the costs of doing
so—either the transaction costs or the inherent disutility of
breaching other norms—are sufficiently low. Thus, whether legal
reforms will be rendered less effective by social norms largely
depends on how closely those legal reforms mirror social norms.
The linkages between law and social norms may explain some
of the successes of Papua New Guinea’s land courts—which in

(stating that adherence to customary land rights in sub-Saharan Africa is done so
because it is more cost efficient to enforce as opposed to formal legal rights).
247 DE SOTO, supra note 7, at 154–55 (discussing how the only real method of
effective enforcement against black markets is to make it prohibitively costly for
merchants to operate); see also ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 51, at
105 (discussing how Shasta county rangers will not comply with closed-range
ordinances so long as it is not cost effective to do so).
248 See McAdams & Rasmusen, supra note 43, at 4 (stating that legal norms
and “real” norms are in less conflict when one is derived from the other).
249 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 622–40 (2000) (discussing several instances, such as
the change in drug laws, where norm reformers have been able to change the law
by giving a “gentle nudge” in enforcement which ultimately led to a complete
change in the law).
250 See McAdams & Rasmusen, supra note 43, at 17 (describing the concept of
legal obedience norms as “an obligation to act in according with the law”); see also
Kahan, supra note 249, at 607 (discussing the reluctance of decisionmakers to
implement a law that alters a social norm).
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some sense formalized customary title by preserving the
customary rules for dealing with land251—as well as the
corresponding failure of the conversion process to freehold in that
country.252 A related example from Cameroon also lends some
support to this point. In many ways, the titling process in
Cameroon was largely ineffective, with most farmers choosing to
remain outside the legal system. However, by the process
established in Cameroon, once farmers began the title process and
paid certain fees, state agents would come to place concrete
boundary markers on their land; following this, many farmers
would give up on the formalization process. As Firmin-Sellers and
Sellers note, while these boundary markers had no legal
significance on their own, these markers enhanced tenure security
because community members would believe that the land was in
some sense backed by the state. This state action actually enhanced
tenure security, since it a) was a relatively low-cost signal of tenure
security, and b) did not conflict substantially with customary law
as it existed in Cameroon.253
By contrast, there may be informal norms that militate against
the use of a more effective formal legal system. Kahan has noted
that if norms conflict with the formal law, this may inhibit law
enforcers from applying the formal law.254 Even beyond the law
enforcers, if the formal law is in stark contrast with the norms of
the individuals who are party to a dispute, they may simply avoid
using it. Most pessimistically, in some circumstances there may be
norms against using the formal legal system and instead in favor of
resolving disputes informally.255
In these circumstances,

251 See Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua
New Guinea, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 759, 766–81 (1991) (describing customary rules
for dealing with land in Papua New Guinea).
252 Robert D. Cooter, The Rule of State Law Versus the Rule-of-Law State:
Economic Analysis of the Legal Foundations of Development 38–40 (John M. Olin
Working Papers in Law, Econ., and Inst. No. 96/97–3, 1996) (discussing the failure
of conversion to freehold in Papua New Guinea); see also Trebilcock, supra note
201, at 384–86 (discussing the aborted attempts to introduce registration systems
in Papua New Guinea).
253 See Firmin-Sellers & Sellers, supra note 235 (arguing that policy makers
could redesign land tenure to give the state a more positive role).
254 Kahan, supra note 249, at 607.
255 See Rikke J. Broegaard, Land Tenure Insecurity and Inequality in Nicaragua,
36 DEV. & CHANGE 845, 845 (2005) (discussing the “lack of enforcement” and “lack
of impartiality” in the formal systems of Nicaragua); see also ELLICKSON, ORDER
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individuals may be disinclined to make use of what might be a
more efficient formal system.
Applied to the context of property, this may suggest that some
of the benefits which the formalists suggest will arise from land
titling programs may not materialize because of the social context.
For example, the ability to use land as collateral requires the ability
of creditors to seize the land. If, however, judges are unwilling to
order that the land of a defaulting debtor be transferred to a
creditor, or if creditors are for some other reason unable to
effectively repossess the land because of local norms, the mere fact
of titling will not enhance the ability of landowners to gain access
to credit.
Norms can also play in important role in encouraging or
discouraging the evolution of the institutions necessary for the
benefits from private property to be realized. For example,
Platteau has discussed how land markets will not develop as long
as landowners feel, because of their own conceptions or because of
social pressures, that their land is inalienable.256 Moreover, as
Fitzpatrick points out, where common property arrangements are
supported by and closely bound up with kinship structures, they
may be exceptionally persistent in the face of external attempts to
create a new property rights framework.257 Unsurprisingly, these
considerations all suggest that one of the major determinants of a
given formal property regime’s acceptance and success will be its
compatibility with informal norms and customs.
3.2. The Existence of Other Markets
The mere fact that individuals have some manner of formal
individual property rights will not necessarily lead them to the
neo-classical profit maximizing outcome, at least as long as
supporting markets are undeveloped.258 Imperfections in credit,

WITHOUT LAW, supra note 51, at 123–36 (demonstrating how people often resolve
their disputes in a cooperative fashion, without regard to formal legal systems).
256 Platteau, supra note 22, at 56–57.
257 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 220, at 1011–16 (discussing the importance of
kinship networks in Third World societies).
258 See Christopher Udry, Efficiency and Market Structure: Testing for Profit
Maximization in African Agriculture (June 1996) (unpublished working paper, on
file with Northwestern University Department of Economics) available at
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~cru2//pdf/separate.pdf (discussing the extent to
which rural development is characterized by competitive markets).
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land, and labor markets can diminish the relative benefits of formal
private property rights.
The existence of a well-functioning credit market is essential for
many of the benefits of private property to be realized. Although
the economic theory discussed above suggests that the potential
collateral created by titling programs will increase the supply of
credit, formal title will not increase farmers’ access to credit if rural
credit markets are themselves underdeveloped or imperfect.259
This will most obviously be the case where there are either formal
restrictions which impede the efficient development of credit
markets or where creditors are unable to use the legal machinery of
the state to enforce debtors’ obligations.260 Even absent such
glaring failures, however, the transaction costs associated with
lending may ration borrowers out of the credit market.261 Carter
formally demonstrates how credit rationing can deprive smaller
landholders of access to credit even in unrestricted credit markets
because of adverse incentive and selection effects.262 There is some
evidence suggesting that such credit rationing has occurred in
practice. Field and Torero examine the impact of a titling program
in Peru, and they find that 34 percent of titled households remain
rationed out of the credit market.263 Boucher et al. find similar
evidence of small farmers being rationed out of the credit market
in Honduras and Nicaragua.264 Such credit-rationing also explains
the results of Carter and Olinto.265
Such credit market inefficiencies can lessen the benefits of
private property in a number of ways. First, the potential supply
of agricultural improvements is reduced, as smaller farmers are
unable to acquire the requisite capital to make efficient

259 See Migot-Adholla et al., supra note 76, at 166 (arguing that land titles
alone will not lead to the development of active rural credit markets); see generally
Boucher et al., supra note 23, at 109–10 (discussing “market-friendly” reforms in
Honduras and Nicaragua).
260 On the second point, see Platteau, supra note 22, at 59–60.
261 See Deininger & Feder, supra note 18, at 11 (suggesting that there are
informal procedures with fewer transaction costs).
262 Michael Carter, Equilibrium Credit Rationing of Small Farm Agriculture, 28 J.
DEV. ECON. 83 (1988).
263 Field & Torero, supra note 83, at 16.
264 See Boucher et al., supra note 23, 109–10 (discussing ongoing credit
constraints for small farmers).
265 See Carter & Olinto, supra note 89 (arguing that “the credit supply effect
tends to favor large-scale producers).
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improvements to their land. Second, where credit markets are
limited and the purchase of land cannot be effectively financed,
land will not necessarily be transferred to the most efficient
producers.266 Third, as Boucher et al. argue, the differential
availability of credit can actual harm labor opportunities for poorer
farmers, at least in the short-term. This can occur because
increased access to credit might allow large landowners to
substitute away from labor in favor of capital-intensive farming,
thus reducing the labor demand of large farmers.267 If this is
coupled with newly titled landowners alienating their land to large
landowners,268 the demand for rural labor might decrease
substantially,
with
potentially
negative
socioeconomic
consequences.
The underdevelopment of land markets can also negate some
of the benefits of more formalized private property rights.
Although many scholars assume that the formalization of property
rights will facilitate the operation of land markets, in certain cases,
because of the failures of other markets or the existence of certain
social norms, the land market may be highly underdeveloped.
Where there is not an active market in land, the other benefits of
strong private property rights may be lessened. For example, if
land markets are thin, land will be a highly illiquid form of
collateral, thereby making it difficult for banks to foreclose
mortgages; this will then hinder the ability of landowners to use
their land as collateral to access credit markets.269 Moreover, if
land is effectively inalienable, the value of improvements to land
cannot be realized, thereby removing one of the avenues by which
stronger property rights can increase investment.
Further inefficiencies can occur if there are simultaneous
imperfections in both land and labor markets.
Significant
transaction costs in the labor market due to high search costs for
labor or pronounced principal-agent problems can prevent
households from employing an optimal amount of labor on their
266 For the theoretical discussion and a survey of applicable literature, see
Deininger & Feder, supra note 18.
267 See Boucher et al., supra note 23, at 110 (arguing that capital-intensive
farming methods might reduce labor opportunities).
268 See text accompanying notes 206–207 (discussing problems of a landless
class).
269 Irving Gershenberg, Customary Land Tenure as a Constraint on Agricultural
Development: A Re-Evaluation, 4 E. AFR. J. RURAL DEV. 51 (1971); Barrows & Roth,
supra note 77, at 295.
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plots, leading smaller households to be relatively less
productive.270 Such labor market imperfections are less important
if land rental or sales markets can transfer the use of that land from
less efficient to more efficient producers. However, in the presence
of imperfections in both labor and land markets, formal property
rights will not be sufficient to lead to efficient uses of land.
3.3. An Effective State
A formal property rights regime cannot simply be created by
decree; rather, it requires the state to create and maintain a variety
of institutions. The most obvious set of necessary institutions are
those which are directly responsible for the functioning of such a
regime. These include an effective method of recording claims
such as surveys and a title registry which can issue title and record
changes reasonably quickly, reliably, and inexpensively.
Because these are often extremely complex systems, many
states which have attempted to create such institutions and issue
titles have been unsuccessful because of the significant
inefficiencies in these systems. An important related case study
describes Kenya’s titling experience.271 There, the formal titling
program begun in the 1950s was largely ignored. Unregistered
land transfers through informal procedures occurred frequently,
leading to increased insecurity and litigation.272 Also problematic
was the fact that people often entirely ignored deeds; ownership of
land was determined by pre-existing informal networks. Similarly,
Firmin-Sellers and Sellers note that the formal titling program is
Cameroon was irrelevant to most rural inhabitants, largely because
of the exceptionally high costs—in the form of exceptionally long
waits for title, corruption, etc.—of obtaining title.273
In
270 See Holden et al., Market Imperfections and Land Productivity in the Ethiopian
Highlands 30–32 (International Food Policy Research Institute, Working Paper No.
76, 2001) available at http://www.ifpri.org/divs/eptd/dp/papers/eptdp76.pdf
(describing market imperfections in rural African economies). For evidence and
further discussion of labor market imperfections, see Udry, supra note 258.
271 Simon F.R. Coldham, Land-Tenure Reform in Kenya: The Limits of Law, 17 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 615 (1979); see also Angelique Haugerud, Land Tenure and
Agrarian Change in Kenya, 59 AFR.: J. INT’L AFR. INST. 61 (1989) (describing Kenya’s
titling experience).
272 The opposite manifestation of this trend was apparent in Rwanda, where
informal land markets developed because of the rapidly increasing value of land,
despite the fact that such markets were illegal under Rwandan law. André &
Platteau, supra note 78, at 1.
273 Firmin-Sellers & Sellers, supra note 235, at 118–20.
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Madagascar, high costs associated with recording land transactions
meant that the title registry became increasingly out of date over
time; property was largely defined by informal documents noting
land transfer and ownership status.274 In urban Vietnam, relatively
few residents have taken advantage of titling programs because of
the strict requirements for documentary evidence needed to prove
residence as well as the fees involved in acquiring title.275
In their study of the land registry program in St. Lucia, Barnes
and Griffith-Charles come to a related but slightly different
conclusion. As with the above studies, they find that over time the
formal property system is becoming increasingly irrelevant, as
transfers in ownership fail to be recorded in the national registry.276
Unsurprisingly, this is linked to the cost of recording such changes.
Surprisingly, however, they find that landowners systematically
overestimate the costs of formally recording land transfers.277 This
indicates that even where actual costs of formalization are low, the
higher perceived costs of formalization may dissuade individuals
from using the formal system.
While a successful formal property rights regime requires the
creation of a number of specialized property-related institutions, it
also requires the existence of a number of related state institutions
that are necessary for the maintenance of the rule of law. Without
the existence of institutions, which allow property owners to
enforce their rights, those rights are meaningless, and the formal
regime will not bring the benefits which it is supposed to provide.
Under these circumstances, individuals will continue to rely on
informal mechanisms for securing their rights, which, as discussed
above, can significantly limit economic development beyond an
undetermined point.278

Jacoby & Minten, supra note 79, at 465–69.
See Kim, supra note 80, at 281–86 (discussing the documentation and
enforcement of property rights in Vietnam, specifically contrasting title and legal
papers).
276 See Grenville Barnes & Charisse Griffith-Charles, Assessing the Formal Land
Market and Deformalization of Property in St. Lucia, 24 LAND USE POL. 494, 500 (2007)
(finding that land titling and registration are not sufficient to create and maintain
a formal land market).
277 Id. at 499.
278 See Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey
of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 117 (1999) (arguing that sound
judicial systems are important to economic growth and surveying some current
studies).
274
275
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The existence of a competent and uncorrupt judiciary is an
important institution for the effective functioning of a formal
property regime.
Without a judiciary that is perceived as
competent, individuals will be unlikely to turn to courts to settle
their disputes, leading to informal dispute resolution mechanisms,
which may not provide individuals with complete legal protection
of their property rights. Similarly, where a corrupt and bribetaking judiciary is the norm, the costs of accessing the justice
system are significantly raised for individuals. This can also create
disincentives for using the formal property regime.
Even where the judiciary is perceived as being competent,
honest, and fair, weak enforcement mechanisms can deter
individuals from seeking to enforce their rights through the courts.
Given the costs associated with litigation, individuals may be loath
to litigate disputes if they believe that a favorable judgment will
not be enforceable.279 For example, the problem of unenforceable
judgments is severe in China. Concerns about enforceability may
also influence the judgment itself. This problem has also been
documented in China, where courts will be reluctant to make
judgments that they believe are politically or socially
unenforceable, such as evicting a tenant who has no place to go.280
While an independent and effective judiciary is a necessary
institution for individuals to be able to enforce their property
rights, it is by no means sufficient. Individuals also need the tools
necessary to access those courts, i.e., lawyers. Where lawyers are
prohibitively expensive and legal aid programs are nonexistent or
underdeveloped, poorer property owners may have difficulties
enforcing their rights. As noted above, this has been a significant
problem in China, where rural farmers have had limited access to
justice and thus have difficulty challenging the illegal decisions
taken by the collective or local governments.281
A functional police force is another institution that plays a
critical role in enforcing and realizing the benefits of strong
property rights. A strong police force protects private property by
deterring and preventing the commission of crimes against
property as well as by apprehending those who commit such
279 See Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The
Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (1996) (describing weak
judicial enforcement mechanisms in China).
280 Id. at 33.
281 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 481–89.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/1

2008]

PROPERTY RIGHTS

465

crimes.282 Where the police are corrupt, individuals may be
reluctant to turn to them; lower income households may
particularly vulnerable, as not only might they be unable to afford
the requisite bribes, they also have the fewest resources to privately
enforce their property rights. Similarly, in some states, the police
function more as a guarantor of the government’s rule rather than
as a protector of private citizen’s rights. Under these conditions,
property rights will effectively be weaker, as individuals will have
fewer protections against the theft or vandalism of their property.
3.4. Concluding Remarks on the Preconditions of a Formal Property
Rights Regime
While the previous Section of this Article concluded that the
costs of a formal property rights regime may outweigh its benefits
in some circumstances, this Section has sought to emphasize that a
formal property regime is intertwined with a number of other
social, economic, and legal institutions. An evaluation of the
operation and benefits of a formal property regime in a given
country also necessarily involves an analysis of these related
institutions, as the success of that property regime depends in large
part on those institutions. Indeed, this Section suggests that formal
property rights institutions cannot simply be grafted onto any state
or society. These insights also suggest a number of related
conclusions.
The above analysis again demonstrates that there are no easy
solutions to questions of economic development. Even if some
scholars are correct in asserting that the lack of formal property
rights is a major reason for underdevelopment, the creation of a
formal property rights regime is likely to require the strengthening
or creation of a number of related institutions.
This Section also reaches a similar conclusion to that of the
Section 1.
Namely, this Section provides support for the
proposition that a formal property regime will function more
successfully in a more developed state. Where an economy is
characterized by the presence of some functioning market
institutions, anti-market social norms relating to prohibitions on
the transfer of land may be less prevalent or will be more
malleable. Moreover, where credit and labor markets are more
282 STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST
DEPENDS ON TAXES 63–64 (1999).
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developed and the state has more resources and a greater capacity
to provide legal protections, individuals will be more likely to turn
to the formal system rather than relying on informal systems.
Thus, this suggests that a formal property rights regime will be
more likely to function successfully at medium rather than low
levels of economic development.
4.

THE PROCESS OF REFORM OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
REGIMES

4.1. Evolutionary Changes in Property Regimes
There is a sense in which the formal and informalist positions
discussed above do not reflect a stark dichotomy of property rights
regimes, but rather general loci along a temporal continuum in the
evolution of property rights. Indeed, a prominent view within the
law and economics movement is that property rights will evolve in
response to an increase in their relative benefits.283 On the one
extreme of the spectrum is an open-access regime, where land is
exceptionally plentiful and the costs of any form of private
property rights outweigh the benefits. As the relative benefits of
private property increase, communal property rights that exclude
outsiders may be a rational response to the economic situation.284
As the relative benefits increase further, individual property rights
may emerge, with—in an economically efficient world—the
optimal degree of formalization occurring where the marginal cost
of further formalization equals the marginal benefit derived from
increased security and clarity.
While greater privatization and formalization may emerge
from more informal regimes as the benefits of such formalization
increase and the costs of formalization decrease, it is important to
identify precisely the major factors that drive this process.
283 See generally Demsetz, supra note 11, at 350–54 (arguing that property
rights emerge in response to new benefit-cost possibilities); ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW, supra note 51 (exploring how in close-knit groups informal norms,
akin to property rights, develop to maximize the welfare of the group as a whole);
North & Thomas, supra note 65 (examining the rise of the Western World with a
focus on the role of property rights in creating incentives to drive economic
growth).
284 See Migot-Adholla et al., supra note 76 (analyzing how an indigenous
African tenure system, a communal property system, has responded to changing
economic circumstances such as increased population and commercialization
pressures).
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Anderson and Hill posit that privatization will increase as a)
relative prices change such that the resource becomes valuable, b)
technological advances decrease the cost of enforcing such rights,
and c) collective action to enforce and recognize those property
rights becomes relatively easier.285 If such evolution of property
rights does indeed naturally occur, it might be the case that there
are limits on what outsiders can and should do with respect to
promoting property rights arrangements.
In a more recent paper, Demsetz has expanded on his earlier
work and identified three major sources of the changes in costs and
benefits that have led towards the greater prevalence of private
property.286 The first factor is the decreased importance of
compactness to the overall economy, by which he means that
private property will emerge as groups become less close-knit. The
second factor is greater productivity; as productivity increases, so
does the “societal interest in arrangements that encourage effort
and facilitate some sharing of the gains from this effort.”287 The
third factor is the increased complexity of resource allocation
problems. Demsetz notes that as specialization of labor increases,
coordination becomes more difficult. While the price mechanism is
a strong decentralized coordination mechanism, it requires a
strong degree of certainty to function. This degree of certainty is
provided by formal property rights.
Although the above accounts describe the conditions under
which such transitions are expected to occur, they largely fail to
identify a mechanism by which a transition between property
rights regimes occurs. The reasoning underlying much of the work
is that such transitions are simply the product of rational
individual or coordinated decisions to define and enforce stronger
property rights,288 although some commentators recognize the role

285 Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights, in
PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 13, at 126–30.
Libecap produces a similar list of factors, but the third factor above is replaced by
“shifts in preferences and other political parameters.” See GARY LIBECAP,
CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 16 (James Alt & Douglass North eds., 1989).
286 Harold Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition
Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S653 (2002).
287 Id. at S663.
288 Anderson and Hill argue that “the creation of new property rights begins
with the heterogeneous entrepreneurial perception of new and different attributes
or uses of a resource. To keep the rents from this perception from being
dissipated in a tragedy of the commons, the entrepreneur must contract to exclude
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of the state in responding to and formalizing such changes.289 In
general, the prediction here is primarily one of the efficient
evolution of social norms with respect to land. Demsetz’s
prediction is manifested in the norms literature by Ellickson, who
hypothesizes that “land rules within a close-knit group evolve so
as to minimize its members’ costs.”290 Not only will social norms
emerge to create order, as discussed above, but furthermore, those
norms will evolve efficiently in response to exogenous changes.291
There seems to be a significant body of empirical evidence in
favor of this general pattern of efficient decentralized evolution.
Alston et al. suggest that people have greater incentives to acquire
formal title where land values increase, and confirm this in their
analysis of the determinants of title registration on the Brazilian
frontier.292 Micelli et al. show that in Kenya, where there is a
system of voluntary conversion from communal trust land to
individual ownership, the likelihood of conversion and gaining
formal title is strongly dependent on the costs and benefits of
doing so.293 Even in China, it may be that a process of Demsetzian
evolution in property rights is occurring to some extent, subject to
political economy considerations and intervention by the central
government. Following Demsetz’s reasoning, Liu et al. argue and
provide empirical support for the proposition that property
protections will be strongest in areas which are land scarce (i.e.,
where the value of the resource is highest), and where there are

others from the value of his perception.” Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill,
Cowboys and Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S489, S492–93 (2002).
289 LIBECAP, supra note 285, at 10–28 (“The ways in which politicians react to
the demands of property owners and their competitors will importantly affect
how property rights institutions are formalized and how wealth is distributed.”)
290 Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1320. This apparently efficient endogeneity of
property regimes has led some to argue that the state should offer a fixed menu of
property options in order to strike a balance between the economic efficiency that
arises from the ability of individuals to use a number of property regimes, and the
transaction costs that occur as the number of property regimes increases. See
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (discussing the
strict standardization of the legal dimensions of property).
291 ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 51.
292 Alston et al., supra note 96, at 57.
293 Thomas Miceli et al., The Demand for Land Title Registration: Theory with
Evidence from Kenya, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 275 (2001).
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significant off-farm opportunities (i.e., where the benefits provided
by the insurance function of land are weakest).294
Examples of this type of evolutionary process are also available
from the developed world. Anderson and Hill, in examining the
American West, show how a trend from open access to private
property occurred in response to the increasing benefits (greater
population density, higher land values) and decreasing costs (the
invention of barbed wire) of enforcing individual property
rights.295 In his discussion of mineral rights in the United States,
Libecap chronicles a relatively smooth emergence of property
rights, as miners came to agreement relatively quickly about
property rights and governments institutionalized these
arrangements.296 In a different context, the development of water
rights in the United States provides support for this thesis, as the
relatively water-plenty Eastern states adopted the English system
of riparian rights, while in the water-scarce Western states, the
more individualized prior appropriation system emerged.297 In a
study of the reversal of this evolutionary process, Haddock and
Kiesling note that because the Black Death significantly decreased
the scarcity of land, large amounts of land reverted from private
land to open access, as it was no longer efficient to hold such land
privately.298 If this evolution towards efficiency is a more general
phenomenon, then it might be argued that the state’s role should
be to facilitate, formalize, and enforce a variety of property rights
regimes along the lines of those which have evolved in a given
society.

294 Shouying Liu et al., Dimensions and Diversity of Property Rights in Rural
China: Dilemmas on the Road to Further Reform, 26 WORLD DEV. 1789, 1790–94 (1998).
295 Anderson & Hill, supra note 196, at 169–72 (discussing the changing
circumstances in the open plains that led to an investment in defining and
enforcing property rights).
296 LIBECAP, supra note 285, at ch. 3.
297 Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law
Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 265–67 (1990); see also Anderson & Hill, supra
note 196, at 176–78 (describing the riparian rights system that was implemented in
as settlers moved into the West).
298 David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S545 (2002).
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4.2. Impediments to Evolutionary Regime Change
There are at least three reasons why this ideal type of evolution
may not occur in property regimes. Each of these will be discussed
in turn.
4.2.1.

The Property Regime as a Public Good

First, it may be that certain components of the process of
property rights formalization are public goods, which would be
underprovided by rational individuals acting independently in the
presence of collective action problems.299 For example, a central
land registry might provide all registered property-holders with
significantly enhanced tenure security compared to a customary
tenure system, by reducing land disputes, but no individual
property owner has an incentive to invest in creating such a system
because of the significant costs involved. Miceli and Keiyah
formally model this problem and show that a universally welfareimproving property system is unlikely to be voluntarily adopted
by all property owners when there are costs involved, as property
owners cannot fully internalize the benefits of the system.300
This problem is likely to be more pronounced at higher levels
of economic development.
At lower levels of economic
development where communities are smaller and more close-knit,
collective action problems can more easily be overcome through
informal norms and practices.301 Moreover, the costs of creating
and maintaining an informal property regime are lower than that
of a formal property regime, thus making collective action
problems easier to overcome. Although this collective action
problem is likely not a substantial problem in relatively informal
property regimes, if a formal property regime is indeed an efficient
institution at a certain level of development where the need for
security of tenure is relatively high, then the collective action
problem is likely to arise eventually.

299 Banner, supra note 197, at S362–64 (discussing the collective action
problem that arises when transitioning to a new property rights regime); see also
DEININGER, supra note 5, at 23–25 (discussing property rights as a public good).
300 Thomas J. Miceli & Joseph Kieyah, The Economics of Land Title Reform, 31 J.
COMP. ECON. 246 (2003).
301 Banner, supra note 197, at 362.
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The Inefficiencies in Informal Regime Change

Certain critiques suggest that norms and informal
arrangements might actually be inefficient, at least for certain
periods of time. There are three reasons for this. First, with respect
to Ellickson’s thesis about the evolution towards efficiency of
norms in close-knit groups, Eric Posner points out that norms
produced in this setting will only be socially efficient for those in
the close-knit group itself.302 In these circumstances, costs will be
externalized as much as possible, meaning that group outsiders
can be significantly harmed by such norms. One might imagine
manifestations of this in the context of property when dealing with
norms that prohibit the transfer of fertile land to group outsiders.
Indeed, André and Platteau have shown how increasing scarcity of
land in Rwanda has led to the development of tighter restrictions
on the customary rights of access to land for certain groups,
including return-migrants, widows, and orphans.303 In an example
from the developed world, Rose argues that a similar phenomenon
occurred in the development of British water law.304 For a period
of time, instead of leading to more formally demarcated private
property rights, the increasing scarcity of water resources led to a
status quo approach to water management whereby ancient water
uses were privileged over newer ones; this represented an effort by
previously advantaged groups to maintain their previously
allocated water rights to the detriment of newcomers.305 As
pointed out above, this may be especially problematic in situations
where group membership is very inflexible and is supported by
family or clan ties, because this may further entrench an otherwise
inefficient arrangement.306
Second, to the extent norms are sticky, reliance on norms may
be extremely inefficient when there are significant lags in the
adjustment of those norms to rapid exogenous changes, such as

302 Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1697, 1698 (1996).
303 André & Platteau, supra note 78, at 39–41.
304 Rose, supra note 297, at 267–274.
305 Id. at 273.
306 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 220, at 1028–29 (arguing, for example, that “a
norm-based system supported by kinship structures is more likely to respond to
rising resource values by tightening its governance mechanisms or enhancing
exclusionary rights”).
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changes in population or technology.307 In the property context,
this might suggest that norms which previously governed land use
efficiently might lag in changing to significant exogenous changes
in population or technology which make land relatively scarce.
For example, while informal mechanisms of transferring land have
developed, in situations where they were previously non-existent,
there may be a significant lag leading to serious inefficiencies. One
author has argued that this problem was actually present in
Demsetz’s case study of the Montagnais Indians, arguing that it
took about two hundred years after the exogenous change in factor
prices caused by the fur trade to lead to a greater degree of
privatization in property relations.308
Closely related to this problem is the issue of path dependence.
It may be that in certain cases, arrangements which have long been
inefficient will be preserved by the sheer weight of the myriad
social layers and interactions that have emerged under those
arrangements.309 The initial inefficient arrangement may be
reinforced by subsequent actions. As North writes, the “existing
institutional structure [creates] organizations with a vested interest
in the existing structure.”310 Where switching costs are, or appear
to be, sufficiently high, this may prevent organic institutional
change.
This notion of path dependence may explain the
continued existence of some cases of inefficient property
arrangements.
Third, Mahoney and Sanchirico provide an alternative critique
of the efficiency of norms based on game-theoretic analysis and
norm evolution. Using the evolutionary framework employed by
Axelrod, discussed earlier,311 they point out that if the mismatch
307 This lag in regime evolution is likely partially related to the costs of
transitioning between regimes. As Banner points out, there may be significant
costs in the process of creating a new property rights regime. See Banner, supra
note 197, at S362 (explaining that establishing and enforcing a new system of
property rights involves significant time and labor). Changes in norms may also
be sticky because individuals have internalized a norm and continue to act on it
despite its inefficiency. On internalization, see POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS,
supra note 56, at 43–44 (debunking a variety of legal theories which attempt to
explain how law influences social norms).
308 Posner, supra note 302, at 1712–13.
309 For a discussion of various aspects of this path dependence, see DOUGLASS
C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 51–52, 156–157
(2005).
310 Id. at 160.
311 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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risk312 of a norm is high relative to the gains from playing efficient
strategies, then efficient norms are unlikely to emerge. They note,
for example, that both “always defect” and “tit-for-tat” are
evolutionarily stable strategies, and that using a slightly different
pay-off structure from Axelrod’s analysis, and assuming random
mutations, it is quite likely for the equilibrium to tip from “tit-fortat” to “always defect,” but not vice versa. Thus, they show that
the evolution towards efficient norms is highly dependent on the
particular costs and benefits of the various arrangements and that
such evolution may not occur, even when it would be socially
beneficial.313
4.2.3.

A Political Economy Model of Change in Property Regimes

Finally, there are some authors who explicitly reject the
efficient evolutionary framework in favor of a political economy
framework for understanding changes in property regimes. Under
this model, changes in property rights regimes occur when groups
have sufficient political power to induce a property regime change
Libecap similarly notes that
that benefits their interests.314
decisions about property rights institutions are made through the
political process and that influential groups can have a significant
impact in determining the property regime, irrespective of
efficiency considerations.315 Because there are costs to creating and
implementing a new property regime, relatively small groups will
have an incentive to cooperate to facilitate regime changes where
the benefits are concentrated in their hands and the detriments are
312 A norm has mismatch risk if it is Pareto optimal when played against
itself, but does relatively poorly against disparate norms.
313 Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social
Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2027 (2001).
314 See Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S421, S421–27 (2002) (claiming that the “prevailing arrangement of
property rights may be the product of politics and interest group-activity”). See
Jean Ensminger & Jack Knight, Changing Social Norms: Common Property,
Bridewealth, and Clan Exogamy, 38 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 1, at 4–5 (1997), for a
survey of the competing positions of efficient norm evolution and norm evolution
as triggered by distributional benefits. See also Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions
as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working
Paper
No.
10481,
2004),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/W10481.pdf, for a historical analysis which argues
that property rights arrangements are primarily determined by political
considerations.
315 LIBECAP, supra note 285, at 4–5.
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widely dispersed among a large segment of the population.316
Sonin provides an alternative model that suggests that the rich
may favor poor property rights protection. Because of their
wealth, the rich may be able to provide private protection for their
own property while using that same private enforcement power to
expropriate others’.317 Thus, under a political economy framework
of property rights, there is no reason to believe that property
arrangements will naturally evolve towards efficient institutions;
indeed, under certain circumstances, the reverse may occur.
Moreover, even where changes to the property regime would
be efficient, under a bargaining or political economy framework of
property rights, difficulties in bringing about those changes may
lead to an inefficient status quo bias. To the extent that significant
agreement is required among different members of a group for
changes in property regimes to take place, certain group
characteristics might make such consensus harder to achieve. As
Libecap notes, as the number of interest groups increases or the
heterogeneity of the interest group’s preferences increases,
agreement will be more difficult to achieve.318 Libecap argues that
the presence of large numbers of heterogeneously-skilled
fisherman was a major impediment to the development of efficient
property arrangements in American fisheries.319
There is some evidence that political economy explanations
have some degree of validity when applied to questions of Chinese
property reform. Some authors have argued that village leaders
play an important role in designing property arrangements for
their villages. Recognizing that a diversity of arrangements exist
throughout China, Rozelle and Li argue that a village leader’s
choice of a particular property regime will depend not only on the
general benefits to the village, but also on the personal interests of

316 See Banner, supra note 197, at S369 (recognizing that “[a] relatively small
number of people who anticipate disproportionately large gains from a transition
will have a greater incentive to cooperate in organizing the transition than would
a larger number of people anticipating gains more equally distributed”); LIBECAP,
supra note 285, at 5–6 (discussing the need for share concession or a side payment
scheme to compensate those who would otherwise oppose property right change).
317 Konstantin Sonin, Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights,
31 J. COMP. ECON. 715 (2003).
318 See LIBECAP, supra note 285, at 21–24 (examining factors that influence
political conflict over distribution and the likelihood of agreement on institutional
change).
319 Id. at ch. 5.
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the leader, as well as the administrative cost of administering a
given system.320 Such political economy considerations might also
help explain certain elements of the 2007 Property Law, which
provided certain concessions to the increasingly politically
important urban middle class—such as rights to parking spaces for
urban dwellers—while arguably changing little for rural farmers.321
4.3. Responding to Evolutionary Failure: The Role of Outsiders
It is important to note that these different impediments to the
Demsetzian evolution of property rights call for different responses
from outsiders in helping to craft reforms for property rights
regimes in developing countries. These responses point to the fact
that a one-size-fits-all solution to creating efficient property
arrangements is unlikely to be successful.
From a policy
perspective, when outsiders identify a state in which an alternative
property arrangement would be more efficient than that already in
place, a necessary prerequisite to an effective plan for remedying
that inefficiency is an understanding of why that inefficient
arrangement has persisted.
If property arrangements have reached a point of sufficient
formalization such that certain aspects of the property regime have
the characteristics of a public good, then the role for outsiders is
largely limited to providing sufficient resources to the state in
question to allow it to overcome this collective action problem.
Expert advice may also be required to help those states with the
challenge of designing and implementing a formal property
regime. Resources and advice may also be required to help those
states bolster other complementary institutions.
In these
circumstances, once the resources and expertise are provided, the
new property arrangement should be quickly adopted, because, by
hypothesis, the aggregate benefits to individuals of such private
property rights will outweigh the costs.
Where the informal evolutionary regime of property
arrangements has become inefficient, a much more active role is
required by both the state and outsiders to create an efficient
property regime.
The first and most obvious challenge is
320 Scott Rozelle & Guo Li, Village Leaders and Land-Rights Formation in China,
88 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1998).
321 Property Law, supra note 115. For a critique, see ECONOMIST, supra note
115 (describing the critiques of the left that consider the 2007 law to be
unconstitutional).
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determining that a particular set of norms is inefficient. Posner
lists five situations in which the state should take action because of
inefficient norms:
(1) If the group members tell the state, or its agents, that the
norm is inefficient or change is desired.
(2) If there is extensive bargaining around a norm.
(3) If there is rapid economic or technological change.322
(4) If there are highly unequal endowments of group members.
(5) If the state detects inefficiencies before the group does.323
Once an inefficient arrangement has been identified, the
problem remains of crafting an appropriate and efficient solution
as well as a strategy for implementing that solution. As above, this
may involve significant amounts of financial support and
expertise. However, in contrast to the first scenario discussed
above, policymakers face the additional hurdle of ensuring that the
inefficient norms that the new formal system seeks to eliminate do
not instead render that system ineffective. Thus, any new system
must be sensitive to existing social norms regarding property. As
discussed above, not only must the new system be obviously
superior to existing norms, but moreover, the new system must be
perceived to be accessible at low cost relative to its benefits, and,
when involving mechanisms that entail marked changes from
entrenched social norms, should be introduced gradually or on a
voluntary basis.324
While the successful implementation of new property
arrangements by either the state or outsiders may be difficult
322 This is precisely the situation in which André & Platteau suggest the state
should intervene. See André & Platteau, supra note 78 (describing the rapid
economic changes in Rwanda resulting in unequal land distribution, rising social
tensions, and ultimately contributing to the civil war in 1994).
323 Posner, supra note 302, at 1726–27 (suggesting ways in which the state may
identify inefficient norms).
324 See supra text accompanying notes 254–256, 271–275; see also Thrainn
Eggertsson, Open Access versus Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS:
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 13, at 73, 77 (discussing the
economic consequences of open access on both the supply and demand side);
Michael J. Trebilcock, Comment on “The Rule of State Law and the Rule-of-Law State:
Economic Analysis of the Legal Foundations of Development,” by Robert D. Cooter, in
ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1996, at 229
(Michael Bruno & Boris Pleskovic eds., 1997) (discussing incentives of
governmental and economic actors to switch to new norms).
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where inefficient norms are relatively stable and effective for at
least certain groups, the case for active intervention is much
stronger where land governance norms are breaking down.
Extremely rapid changes in land scarcity have in some cases also
led to increased land conflict, as inefficient norms have broken
down without new norms emerging to replace them. In these
circumstances, litigation or more violent means have consumed
significant resources in resolving disputes,325 and there may be a
significant role for the government or external actors to identify
such problems and craft appropriate solutions.
While the above discussion optimistically suggests that the first
two impediments can largely be overcome through the provision
of resources and expertise, where an inefficient arrangement exists
because of political economy considerations, no simple solution
exists. Where an existing inefficient property arrangement benefits
certain actors, those actors will resist attempts to change that
regime. If the state is exceptionally weak or is captured by those
actors who benefit from the inefficient regime, then the provision
of resources or expertise is likely to have no impact, as the state
will be unwilling or unable to use those resources to implement the
new property regime. Under such circumstances, a successful
property regime change would require either strengthening those
groups in favor of the reform, or convincing elites to accept
changes either through rewards or sanctions. Although this is not
the appropriate context to elaborate or propose theories of the
political economy of property rights reform, the point remains that
under these circumstances, the introduction of formal property
rights would be significantly more difficult and could not be
accomplished by even the best-designed World Bank titling
program.

325 On Kenya, see Barrows & Roth, supra note 77 for a discussion on land
tenure and investment in African agriculture. On Rwanda, see André & Platteau,
supra note 78, which describes the rapid economic changes in Rwanda resulting in
unequal land distribution, rising social tensions, and ultimately contributing to
the civil war in 1994. See also DEININGER, supra note 5, at 35 (discussing how
disputes over land create a myriad of negative impacts and consequences);
Fitzpatrick supra note 220, at 1031–33 (explaining how an inability to prevent
resource use from outside groups can result in norm-based regime deterioration
and intercommunity conflict); Karim Hussein et. al., Increasing Violent Conflict
Between Herders and Farmers in Africa: Claims and Evidence, 17 DEV. POL’Y REV. 397
(1999) (discussing competition and violent conflict over natural resources between
herders and farmers in Africa).
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4.4. Concluding Remarks on the Process of Reform of Property Rights
Regimes
While the discussion of the first two questions raised in this
Article adopted a static approach to the examination of property
regimes, this Section has adopted a dynamic approach and
examined potential paths for the development of property regimes
over time. As in the above Sections, this Section suggests that the
issue of whether outsiders should support the creation of a formal
property rights regime is far from clear. The lack of a strong
formal property regime in a given state may represent a lack of
resources or some other evolutionary failure which calls for the
assistance of outsiders. However, the absence of a formal property
regime may also simply reflect the fact that such a regime would
be inefficient in the circumstances. Thus, an analysis of whether or
not a titling program would benefit a given state necessarily
involves understanding why a formal property system does not yet
exist in that state.
Moreover, as highlighted extensively in the preceding Section
on the preconditions for a formal property rights regime, this
Section has further demonstrated that the success of a formal
property rights regime is highly dependent on the context. The
same impediments blocking the efficient evolution of the property
regime can also operate to render ineffective those very programs
which attempt to overcome those hurdles. It cannot simply be
presumed that the external provision of funding or expertise to
create the framework of a formal property regime will be sufficient
to ensure its successful adoption.
Indeed, the same costs,
inefficient social norms, or political interests that precluded the
endogenous development of a formal property rights regime may
similarly hinder the successful operation of that regime even after
the institutional framework of that regime has been created.
5.

CONCLUSION

The above discussion has highlighted many of the issues
surrounding property rights and development. Because of the
complex interactions between a property rights regime and the
social, economic, political, and legal framework within which such
a regime operates, it is not fruitful simply to argue for or against
the formalization of a property rights regime. Rather, the
relationship between property rights and development is much
more complex, and a more nuanced approach to these issues is
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required. As North writes, “[t]he first requirement for improving
economic performance is to have a clear understanding of the
sources of poor economic performance.”326
This statement
certainly applies to the relationship between property rights and
economic performance.
The context-dependence of successful property regimes leads
to three important considerations. First, property formalization
programs must not be considered as isolated economic
development projects as one might consider certain physical
infrastructure projects. Rather, such programs must be considered
as part of a general framework for economic development,
typically including a wider set of reforms aimed at the promotion
of the rule of law.327 Contrary to the optimistic rhetoric of De
Soto’s work,328 property formalization programs are not by
themselves the key to unlocking the potential of the developing
world. While a formal property regime may be a necessary
condition for economic growth beyond a certain level of
development, it is by no means sufficient.
Second, in determining what role outsiders can play in helping
promote a state’s formal property regime, it is essential to ask a
broader question about the similarities between optimal property
regimes. If the optimality of a property rights regime is contextindependent, then a titling program developed by theorists in
Washington or from elsewhere in the developed world may indeed
be applicable and beneficial to extremely diverse countries.
However, because the characteristics of a property regime are
highly dependent on local context, it is unrealistic to expect that
one model of a successful regime would be applicable across
various states. In fact, one would expect that the characteristics of
property regimes as well as strategies for their implementation will
differ substantially across states. This suggests that, in practice,
local or regional models of property regimes may be more
successful than Western models.329

NORTH, supra note 309, at 163.
DAM, supra note 1, at ch. 10 (examining the implications of a rule-of-law
approach to economic development).
328 DE SOTO, supra note 7.
329 For recent work on this notion see Sharun W. Mukand & Dani Rodrik, In
Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation, and Economic
Performance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 374 (2005), which argues for implementation of
appropriate policies and institutional arrangements on the local level.
326
327
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Finally, significant changes to property regimes should be
approached with caution and drastic, uniform top-down property
changes should be avoided.330 Contrary to conventional economic
thinking, the formalization of property rights is not necessarily
desirable at all stages of development or for all property owners.
Formalization programs can have far-reaching social and economic
consequences, and under certain conditions, formalization
programs can have negligible or deleterious impacts. The contextspecificity of property rights regimes is not, however, a reason for
inaction or a reason to counsel against the formalization of
property rights in all cases. As noted above, under some
circumstances, formal property rights have increased efficiency
and led to economic growth, and it would thus be poor policy
never to support the formalization of property rights.
Because of these considerations, unless there is clear and
compelling evidence pointing to the need for a systematic state-led
formalization program, the optimal response may be a voluntary
and sporadic system of title registration. Although a sporadic
program of title registration is not without its own costs,331 such a
program brings substantial benefits relative to a systematic
formalization program. As one of the Authors has argued
elsewhere, in the face of limited resources and state capacity, a
sporadic system of land registration has the benefit of providing
the additional security and clarity of formal property rights to
those desiring it most.332 By simply providing an additional
vehicle for owning property, a sporadic registration program does
not require disturbing the arrangements of those groups that are
content with the status quo. Where customary arrangements limit
individuals’ economic opportunities, the option of formalization is
present. These characteristics suggest that such a system can
operate as the backbone of an efficient Demsetzian evolution of
property regimes. Moreover, a voluntary system overcomes the
collective action problem of providing the machinery for the

330 For a classic paper exploring the importance of avoiding drastic imposed
changes see Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959). See also JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN
SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998).
331 Trebilcock, supra note 201, at 412 (using the example of Papua New
Guinea to elucidate the costs that accompany a sporadic program of title
registration).
332 Id. at 412–413.
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enforcement of those property rights by having the state provide it
and allowing people to opt into it.
Perhaps the strongest benefit, however, of a sporadic and
voluntary formalization system is that it avoids the myriad
unforeseeable and potentially negative consequences that can
result from the top-down imposition of a uniform system of
property arrangements. As this Article has stressed repeatedly, a
property rights regime is not an isolated institution, but rather an
institution which has strong interrelationships within a variety of
other institutions. In such circumstances and where policymakers
have imperfect or limited information, it may be impossible to
predict all the potential consequences flowing from drastic
institutional changes, and unpredictable negative consequences
may emerge from imposed changes.333 A gradual and reversible
process of voluntary change at the individual level can mitigate
such potentially harmful consequences.
Even in situations where a systematic program is clearly
superior to a voluntary program, drastic and irreversible changes
should be avoided. Rather, changes should be incremental in
nature. For example, where communal property is prevalent,
rather than registering individual titles to specified plots of land to
the exclusion of all others, a rudimentary titling program could be
undertaken utilizing simple compass and chain rather than fullscale cadastral surveys where only the base group title would be
registered without prejudice to the various functional rights that
others might possess under customary law. Landowning groups
might also be given a more formal legal structure and clearer
decision or governance rules (akin to private corporations with
restrictions on share transferability), while maintaining limits on
outright alienability of group land.334 Such programs lessen the
potential for serious social conflict or disruption from abrupt legal
change and facilitate an evolutionary process for the emergence of
strong private property rights.
333 For interesting examples relating to this point, see SCOTT, supra note 330.
See also Rachel E. Kranton & Anand V. Swamy, The Hazards of Piecemeal Reform:
British Civil Courts and the Credit Market in Colonial India, 58 J. DEV. ECON. 1 (1999)
(discussing how reform led to increased competition among lenders, and the
resulting effects on the farmers of India).
334 See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 242 (discussing the circumstances in
which different models of property rights may work); Trebilcock, supra note 201
(discussing various approaches to the phenomenon of communal land rights
evolving to private property).
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